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This dissertation examines how listeners reach pragmatic interpretations of 
irony in real-time.  Over four experiments I addressed limitations of prior work by 
using fine-grained measures of time course, providing strong contexts to support 
ironic interpretations, and accounting for factors known to be important for other 
linguistic phenomena (e.g., frequency).  Experiment 1 used a visual world eye-
tracking paradigm to understand how comprehenders use context and frequency 
information to interpret irony.  While there was an overall delay for ironic utterances 
compared to literal ones, the speed of interpretation was modulated by frequency.  
Participants interpreted frequent ironic criticisms (e.g., “fabulous chef” about a bad 
chef) more quickly than infrequent ironic compliments (e.g., “terrible chef” about a 
good chef).  In Experiment 2A, I tested whether comprehending irony (i.e., drawing a 
pragmatic inference) differs from merely computing the opposite of an utterance.  
  
The results showed that frequency of interpretation (criticisms vs. compliments) did 
not influence processing speed or overall interpretations for opposites.  Thus, 
processing irony involves more than simply evaluating the truth-value condition of an 
utterance (e.g., pragmatic inferences about the speaker’s intentions).  This was 
corroborated by Experiment 2B, which showed that understanding irony involves 
drawing conclusions about speakers in a way that understanding opposites does not.  
Opposite speakers were considered weirder and more confusing than ironic speakers.  
Given the delay in reaching ironic interpretations (Exp. 1), Experiments 3 and 4 
examined the cognitive mechanics that contribute to inhibiting a literal interpretation 
of an utterance and/or promoting an ironic one.  Experiment 3 tested whether 
comprehending irony engages cognitive control to resolve among competing 
representations (literal vs. ironic).  Results showed that hearing an ironic utterance 
engaged cognitive control, which then facilitated performance on a subsequent high-
conflict Stroop trial.  Thus, comprehenders experience conflict between the literal and 
ironic interpretations.  In Experiment 4, however, irony interpretation was not 
facilitated by prior cognitive control engagement.  This may reflect experimental 
limitations or late-arriving conflict.  I end by presenting a model wherein access to 
the literal and ironic interpretations generates conflict that is resolved by cognitive 
control.  In addition, frequency modulates cue strength and generates delays for 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Speakers use irony to express information contradictory to what they say.  For 
example, if a speaker says, “What a fabulous chef Fred is,” we might conclude that 
Fred cooks well (literal interpretation).  However, if we just saw Fred make a mess, 
we would instead infer that he is a terrible chef (ironic interpretation).  Speakers are 
ironic for a range of social purposes: testing and bolstering common ground (Brown, 
1995), saving face when making criticisms (Dews & Winner, 1995; Jorgensen, 1996), 
increasing politeness (Attardo, 2001), and alienating others (Colston, 1997).  For a 
comprehender, accurately interpreting irony requires the consideration of context and 
the speaker’s goals.  For example, in order for the comprehender to understand that 
“fabulous” is being used ironically, he must consider the mess Fred made (the 
context).  In addition, the comprehender must take into account the identity of the 
speaker, who may have a tendency to use irony and is unlikely to be complimenting 
Fred.  Thus, listeners have to interpret irony by way of a pragmatic inference.  When 
the speaker makes a positive statement about Fred’s cooking, the listener must 
consult the context to recognize this is a false statement. 
According to Grice (1975), the mismatch between context and a speaker’s 
utterance leads the listener to generate an inference that the speaker must have 
actually meant the opposite of what they said.  This is because speakers are 
cooperative and generally do not utter false statements (the Maxim of Quality).  
When the listener hears the speaker describe Fred as “fabulous,” he consults the 
context (Fred’s mess) and realizes that the speaker’s utterance is false.  The violation 
of the Maxim of Quality, combined with the listener’s assumption that the speaker is 
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being cooperative, leads the listener to draw a pragmatic inference that the speaker 
must have meant something other than what he said: namely, the ironic interpretation.  
In this way, listeners make use of this assumption of cooperation to correctly interpret 
ironic utterances. 
While it is known that listeners must consult the context and speaker goals to 
understand irony, when and how they do so is unknown.  The experiments described 
in this dissertation will help us to better understand how comprehenders process irony 
as well as the semantics-pragmatics interface more broadly.  In particular, these 
experiments address key limitations of existing work on irony comprehension, such 
as by using more fine-grained measures of time course, providing strong contexts to 
support ironic interpretations, and considering factors known to be important for other 
linguistic phenomena, such as frequency.  By overcoming these limitations, the 
present dissertation helps explain how comprehenders use context to reach ironic 
interpretations. 
In the remainder of this chapter I will first discuss the social functions that 
irony serves.  I will then provide an overview of the existing accounts of irony 
comprehension, as well as their strengths and weaknesses.  To address these 
weaknesses, I will present two possible accounts of irony processing that will be 
tested in this dissertation.  Finally, I will preview the four experiments of this 
dissertation. 
Social functions of irony 
Given that irony may lead to comprehension difficulty, one might wonder 
why speakers bother to use irony to begin with.  Irony carries with it certain 
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pragmatic functions that literal language may not convey.  One pragmatic function 
that irony bestows is to enhance relationships and group affiliation.  Irony builds 
solidarity by conveying negative judgments about others (Attardo, 2001).  This 
creates an “in-group feeling” (p. 173), wherein the speaker and listener feel more 
attached and familiar with each other.  Irony thus creates the sense between 
interlocutors that “you and I are the same” (Lakoff, 1990, p. 173).  One reason for this 
may be that irony can serve as a way to test the amount of shared knowledge (Brown, 
1995).  As a result, irony use can highlight and bolster common ground: the set of 
beliefs, knowledge, and experience shared by the speaker and listener.  For example, 
a speaker may use irony to comment on a problem relevant to both the speaker and 
listener, thereby highlighting the shared nature of the experience (and strengthening 
the interlocutors’ bond).  The role of irony in strengthening relationships seems to be 
further supported by the fact that individuals in closer relationships are more likely to 
use irony (Pexman & Zvaigzne, 2004; Sally, 2003).  In one study, participants were 
asked to read brief stories ending in an ironic utterance and had to rate the 
appropriateness of the utterance (Kreuz, Kassler, Coppenrath, & Allen, 1999).  For 
example, the speaker might say, “you sure were the hit of the party!” after the listener 
fell asleep at a party.  Participants rated ironic utterances as more appropriate when 
there was greater common ground between the speaker and listener (e.g., a husband 
and wife as opposed to two strangers).  Thus, having more common ground between 
interlocutors seems to make ironic utterances more appropriate. 
Additionally, irony can be used for criticisms in order to save face for the 
speaker and make the speaker seem less rude (Dews & Winner, 1995; Jorgensen, 
 4 
 
1996; cf. Colston, 1997).  Saving face fulfills the speaker’s desire to be liked and 
respected (Brown, 1995).  For example, Dews and Winner (1995) had subjects read 
short stories ending in ironic or literal criticisms (e.g., “you’re so considerate” said to 
someone who just stole something).  Participants rated ironic criticisms as less critical 
than literal ones, as well as less likely to negatively affect the speaker-listener 
relationship.  Furthermore, because using irony to make a criticism is less face 
damaging than outright aggression, it can be used to make criticisms more polite 
(Attardo, 2001; Boylan & Katz, 2013).  Indeed, comprehenders rate ironic criticisms 
as more polite and positive than literal ones (Boylan & Katz, 2013).  Similarly, irony 
can be used for humor, and comprehenders perceive ironic speakers as being funnier 
(Dews, Kaplan, & Winner, 1995; Gibbs, Bryant, & Colston, 2014; Kumon-
Nakamura, Glucksberg, & Brown, 1995; Matthews, Hancock, & Dunham, 2006).  
Irony can therefore be used for a range of social purposes to influence the relationship 
between interlocutors. 
Current accounts of irony comprehension 
While it is known that the social functions of irony can increase group 
affiliation, it is less clear how listeners reach ironic interpretations through the 
coordination of various sources of evidence (e.g., context and what the utterance 
literally means).  Work on irony comprehension has largely focused on whether the 
literal interpretation of an ironic utterance is necessarily initiated and completed prior 
to the ironic one.  According to the standard pragmatic view, comprehending irony 
occurs in stages (Cutler, 1976; Dews & Winner, 1999; Giora et al., 2007).  The 
listener first accesses the context-independent literal interpretation of an ironic 
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utterance.  Then, if there is a mismatch with the literal interpretation and the context 
(e.g., speaker identity, prior events), the listener reaches the ironic interpretation by 
computing the opposite of the literal meaning of the utterance.  On this view, context 
is not used until later in processing, after the literal interpretation has already been 
reached.  For example, after hearing “What a fabulous chef Fred is,” the listener 
would first interpret the utterance as meaning that Fred cooks well.  The listener 
would then consult the context (e.g., Fred’s mess) and revise the initial (incorrect) 
literal interpretation.  Because there are multiple stages involved, the standard 
pragmatic view predicts that ironic utterances will be understood more slowly than 
literal ones.  
In contrast, the direct access view posits that context interacts with lexical 
processing early on (Gibbs, 1986; Ivanko & Pexman, 2003).  That is, if the ironic 
interpretation of an utterance is supported by the context, the listener can access this 
interpretation without the need to first access the literal meaning.  Thus, the listener 
would observe Fred’s mess (and perhaps the speaker’s likelihood to use irony) and 
would therefore reach the ironic interpretation immediately upon hearing “fabulous.”  
In contrast to the standard pragmatic view, the direct access view claims that ironic 
utterances should be understood as quickly as (or even faster than) literal ones. 
Finally, the graded salience hypothesis combines aspects of the standard 
pragmatic and direct access views.  According to this hypothesis, the more salient 
interpretation of an utterance is always accessed first (Giora, 1997).  An utterance is 
“salient” if it is encoded in the mental lexicon, that is, if it can be interpreted without 
considering contextual information.  The salience of a word or phrase may be 
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influenced by its frequency, familiarity, or conventionality (Giora, Fein, & Schwartz, 
1998).  The ironic meaning of familiar ironies is lexicalized and therefore accessed 
directly, but unfamiliar ironies are processed in stages: salient literal meaning first, 
then ironic.  For example, if “what a fabulous chef” is a familiar irony (e.g., based on 
frequency of use), then listeners should only access the negative, ironic interpretation 
of the utterance (Fred is a bad chef).  However, if “what a fabulous chef” is 
unfamiliar, then participants should first access the literal interpretation (Fred is a 
good chef), and then the ironic one (Fred is a bad chef).  Thus, while this account 
predicts that sometimes irony is accessed in stages (as in the standard pragmatic 
view), it may also be accessed directly under certain circumstances. 
Empirical evidence for comprehension accounts 
Evidence for these three accounts of irony processing is mixed.  Some work 
seems to support the standard pragmatic view (Cutler, 1976; Dews & Winner, 1999; 
Giora et al., 2007).  For example, Dews and Winner (1999) had participants read 2-3 
sentence stories that ended in one character making either a literal or an ironic 
comment.  The participants’ task was to judge whether the speaker meant something 
positive or something negative.  Dews and Winner found that participants took longer 
to judge ironic utterances compared to literal ones.  This delay seems to suggest that 
comprehending irony requires additional stages (i.e., accessing the literal 
interpretation).  Importantly, because participants’ reaction times were only measured 
for the judgments they made after reading the entire sentence, it is difficult to 
determine the precise cause of the delay.  For example, while it could be the case that 
the literal interpretation preceded the ironic one, it is also possible that the two 
 7 
 
interpretations were accessed simultaneously.  This particular paradigm cannot 
disentangle these two possibilities.  In addition, due to the design of the study, the 
observed delay could either arise from the processing of the ironic utterance itself, or 
from the task of making a positive/negative judgment about ironic utterances. 
Other work has focused on the speaker’s linguistic tendencies in order to 
establish context for irony.  For example, Giora et al. (2007) presented subjects with 
dialogues between two friends.  In each dialogue, one speaker produced an ironic 
utterance and then later, produced another utterance (target sentence) that could be 
interpreted ironically or literally, based on the dialogue context.  If context is used 
early, then participants should the read ironic utterances as quickly as the literal ones.  
However, if context is not integrated until later in processing (leading to a multi-step 
process), reading times for ironic utterances should be slower than for literal ones.  
The results supported the latter alternative.  Specifically, target sentence reading 
times were slower following ironic-biasing dialogues compared to literal-biasing 
ones, suggesting that context effects may be delayed during comprehension (leading 
to delayed irony comprehension).  Critically, however, it is possible that the 
contextual cues provided were not strong enough for the subjects to use.  Subjects did 
not receive any explicit information about the speakers and they encountered new 
speakers with each dialogue. 
Multiple studies have also supported the direct access account of irony 
comprehension.  In one of the earliest psycholinguistic studies of irony 
comprehension, Gibbs (1986) had participants read stories that ended in literal or 
ironic utterances.  He found that participants were faster to read ironic comments 
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(e.g., “You are a fine friend”) compared to their literal counterparts (e.g., “You are a 
bad friend”), which was interpreted to mean that comprehenders do not need to access 
the literal interpretation prior to the ironic one.  Importantly, whole sentence reading 
times may be too coarse grained to accurately answer questions about real-time 
processing; a more fine-grained measure of online interpretations may be necessary.  
Similarly, Ivanko and Pexman (2003) had participants complete a self-paced reading 
task with stories ending in literal or ironic statements.  In line with Gibbs’ (1986) 
findings, participants read the ironic statements as quickly as the literal ones given a 
strongly supportive context.  However, the conclusions we can draw from these 
results are somewhat limited for two reasons.  First, the authors compared reading 
times for positive adjectives (in the ironic condition) with negative adjectives (in the 
literal condition).  Given the fact that negative words tend to be read more slowly 
than positive ones (Ivanko & Pexman, 2003; Kuchinke et al., 2005; Schact & 
Sommer, 2009), this could lead to artificially faster reading times for the ironic 
condition.  The second reason is that all of the contexts were negative, which meant 
that all of the ironic utterances were ironic criticisms (the more frequent type of 
irony).  It is possible then that their findings might be different for less frequent ironic 
compliments, as frequency has well-known effects on the time course of 
comprehension at multiple levels of representations (Duffy, Morris, & Rayner, 1988; 
Forster & Chambers, 1973; Rayner & Raney, 1996). 
Finally, there is also evidence for the graded salience account.  For example, 
Giora and Fein (2007) had participants complete a lexical decision task after reading 
familiar or less familiar ironies in irony- or literal-biasing contexts.  In irony-biasing 
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contexts, less familiar ironies were interpreted literally initially (150ms post-offset) 
and ironically later (1,000ms post-offset).  However, familiar ironies were interpreted 
both literally and ironically initially (150ms post-offset) and later (1,000ms post-
offset).  Thus, they argue that salient meanings are always processed initially, 
regardless of contextual information.  Importantly, these findings may also be 
consistent with the standard pragmatic view, where the literal interpretation is reached 
prior to the ironic one.  Specifically, it is possible that for familiar ironies, the literal 
analysis was reached before 500ms, rather than both the literal and ironic 
interpretations being reached simultaneously.  Distinguishing between these 
possibilities requires a more temporally fine-grained measure of online irony 
processing.  Filik, Leuthold, Wallington, and Page (2014) conducted a later 
experiment using eye-tracking while reading.  Participants read short stories 
containing a target utterance that was either ironic or literal (as determined by the 
prior context), and was disambiguated by a single word.  They manipulated the 
materials such that half of the ironic utterances were familiar and half were 
unfamiliar.  In line with the graded salience account, Filik et al. found that compared 
to their literal counterparts, unfamiliar ironies were read more slowly than familiar 
ones.  The delay for unfamiliar ironies was reflected in gaze duration on the critical 
disambiguating word as well as the post-critical region.  Filik et al. argue that the 
effects observed in the post-critical region indicate that participants were reanalyzing 
the target sentence as being ironic.  Critically, it is difficult to determine whether the 
post-critical region delays were due to a reanalysis of an initial literal interpretation, 
or the simultaneous activation of both the literal and ironic interpretations.  In 
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addition, Filik et al. did not take into account irony frequency in their experiment.  
Based on the sample stimuli provided in their paper, all of the contexts were negative, 
which meant that all of the ironic utterances were the more frequent ironic criticisms.  
It is possible that the difference in reading times for familiar and unfamiliar ironies 
could disappear if the ironies used were the less frequent ironic compliments.  
Finally, it is hard to identify a clear-cut pattern of results that could be used to falsify 
the graded salience hypothesis.  Because “salience” isn’t clearly defined or 
necessarily measurable, it is difficult to determine how the theory could be falsified at 
all, which therefore diminishes its potential theoretical contribution to the field.  
Thus, the extent to which these various findings support the standard, direct, 
or graded salience accounts of irony comprehension is unclear.  In particular, there 
are open questions about the time-course of irony interpretation (i.e., when listeners 
use various evidential cues to inform an ironic analysis of an utterance).  
Furthermore, existing work has not adequately addressed other factors that may 
influence the speed of irony comprehension, such as the frequency of certain types of 
irony (i.e., ironic criticisms vs. compliments). 
Moving beyond traditional models 
Although traditional models of irony processing consider the relationship 
between the literal and ironic interpretations, they make contradicting predictions 
regarding the role of different sources of information over time.  That is, they do not 
explain how linguistic and contextual information are accessed and integrated on a 
fine-grain scale during real-time processing.  For example, there may be 
circumstances in which listeners might need to use the semantic analysis to guide use 
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of pertinent contextual cues (e.g., speaker identity).  In addition, these accounts do not 
always consider how other properties of irony, such as frequency, are considered 
during irony comprehension.  There are two forms of irony that differ in their 
frequency.  When a positive utterance is uttered to convey a negative sentiment about 
an individual, this is known as an ironic criticism (e.g., saying that Fred is a fabulous 
chef after he made a mess in the kitchen).  A speaker produces an ironic compliment, 
by contrast, when they use a negative statement to ironically describe a successful 
individual (e.g., if Fred had made a beautiful cake, a speaker could say, “What a 
terrible chef Fred is”).  Ironic criticisms are generally more frequent or conventional 
than ironic compliments (Gibbs, 2000).  It is well known that frequency information 
is important in literal language comprehension (Duffy et al., 1988; Forster & 
Chambers, 1973; Rayner & Raney, 1996).  However, it is unknown whether listeners 
track and make use of frequency information for pragmatic phenomena like irony. 
Thus, there are a number of limitations to the existing accounts of irony 
comprehension that need to be addressed.  As described above, there are conflicting 
findings about when and how the ironic interpretation is accessed.  While some work 
indicates that the ironic interpretation may be accessed immediately and directly (e.g., 
Gibbs, 1986; Ivanko & Pexman, 2003), other work suggests the literal interpretation 
is sometimes accessed prior to the ironic one (Dews & Winner, 1999; Giora et al., 
2007).  It is possible that other factors, such as irony frequency, may help account for 
these discrepancies, though this has yet to be tested.  An additional reason for these 
conflicting findings may be the fact that many studies use only coarse-grained 
measures of processing (e.g., Gibbs, 1986; Giora & Fein, 2007).  As a result, they 
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may not accurately capture how the literal and ironic interpretations are accessed in 
real-time.  Furthermore, it is important to consider the type of context that listeners 
are provided in these experiments.  The majority of the studies reviewed here present 
a brief, written story involving two or more characters, followed by an ironic 
utterance.  Strengthening these contexts will reveal whether findings that favor the 
standard pragmatic view actually characterize irony processing in general, or whether 
they are driven by contexts that are insufficiently irony-biasing.  Finally, to assess 
whether irony comprehension is slower than literal utterance comprehension, it is 
necessary to compare ironic utterances to appropriate literal baselines.  Since negative 
adjectives are processed more slowly than positive ones (Kuchinke et al., 2005; 
Schact & Sommer, 2009), ironic utterances with negative adjectives should be 
compared to literal utterances with negative adjectives (and positive ironic with 
positive literal). 
Two models of irony comprehension 
Two possible processing accounts of irony comprehension are shown in 
Figure 1, which seek to explain how speaker goal information (context) and 
frequency are used to direct comprehenders’ processing commitments for irony.  As 
the figure depicts, interpreting a literal utterance involves connecting the utterance 
(e.g., “What a fabulous chef Fred is”; white arrows) to its corresponding lexical 
entries.  These entries encode some frequency information (e.g., “fabulous” is 
frequent, while “terrible” is less frequent).  The lexical entries then connect to higher 
order conceptual representations that represent meaning.  However, how frequency 
and contextual information are used in irony comprehension is up for debate. 
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One possibility is that both the literal and ironic interpretations of an ironic 
utterance are available initially, and that contextual information (e.g., speaker goal 
and identity information) is recruited immediately (Early Access account, see Figure 
1A).  According to this account, irony is stored in the lexicon in a similar way as the 
two meanings of a homophone.  As it does for homophones, frequency would 
modulate the speed of interpretation of irony.  This is because there are extra 
connections from the lexical entries to the concepts that carry the opposite valence 
(e.g., “fabulous” to bad).  Moreover, some uses of irony are simply more frequent 
than other uses: speakers are more inclined to use a positive adjective to criticize a 
negative event (Gibbs, 2000).  The thickness of the gray arrows in Figure 1 represents 
the frequency of the interpretation: ironic criticisms are more frequent than ironic 
compliments.  On this account, more frequent ironic criticisms would be accessed 
simultaneously with the literal interpretation; providing context to support the ironic 
interpretation would wipe out any potential delays.  However, there would be a 
slowdown for less frequent ironic compliments.  That is, the comprehender should be 
slower to reach the ironic interpretation of “terrible” used to compliment Fred, 
compared to “fabulous” used to criticize Fred.  These findings should hold even with 
a strong, irony-biasing context (e.g., strong knowledge of speaker identity and 
tendencies to use irony).  This would be similar to the findings for word recognition, 
where both context and frequency influence processing (Duffy et al., 1988; Swinney, 
1979). 
Alternatively, it is possible that the ironic interpretation is only accessed after 
the literal one is reached, and contextual information is not integrated until later in 
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processing (Late Access account, see Figure 1B).  On this account, ironic 
interpretations are not stored in the lexicon.  Even if contextual cues are present 
before the speaker says anything (e.g., via speaker identity), comprehenders may have 
difficulty tracking and coordinating these cues before engaging in semantic analysis.  
This would be similar to some findings for scalar implicatures (Bott & Noveck, 2004; 
Huang & Snedeker, 2009; Huang & Snedeker, 2011; Tomlinson, Bailey, & Bott, 
2013), where semantic analysis mediates pragmatic inferencing.  In this case, the 
processor would not immediately consult these contextual cues, even with strongly 
irony-biasing contexts.  Because context is only taken into account late in processing, 
frequent ironic criticisms and less frequent ironic compliments would both be 
accessed equally slowly.  Thus, evidence of an overall delay for irony would suggest 
that, unlike homophones, ironic interpretations are not stored in the lexicon. 
The experiments described in this dissertation test these models.  That is, they 
seek to determine how context (e.g., speaker goals) and frequency influence the speed 
with which a comprehender reaches an ironic interpretation, and how the semantic 





Figure 1. Two possible models of irony comprehension: (A) Early Access and (B) 
Late Access.  White arrows represent literal interpretations; gray arrows represent 
ironic interpretations.  The thickness of the gray arrows represents the frequency of 
the interpretation.  On the Early Access account, the literal and ironic interpretations 
are accessed simultaneously, and irony frequency mediates processing time.  On the 
Late Access account, the literal interpretation is accessed prior to the ironic one, and 
irony frequency does not mediate processing time. 
Remaining questions and specific aims 
As described above, prior research leaves open critical questions about how 
comprehenders use context and frequency to reach ironic interpretations in real-time.  
To address these questions it is necessary to use a fine-grained measure of online 
processing (e.g., eye-tracking during listening) where the speed of irony processing is 
compared to an appropriate baseline.  For example, negative adjectives used 
ironically should be compared to negative adjectives used literally.  In addition, these 
experiments must manipulate irony frequency by comparing ironic criticisms with 
irony compliments.  Finally, ironic utterances should be presented with strong 




In this dissertation, Experiment 1 makes use of the visual world eye-tracking 
paradigm.  Participants see events featuring two characters (e.g., Sally bakes a 
beautiful cake while Fred makes a mess).  They then hear either a literal or ironic 
speaker describe Fred or Sally using a positive or negative adjective (“What a 
fabulous/terrible chef s/he is”).  Participants are told that one speaker is always literal 
and one speaker is always ironic (these are distinguished by speaker gender).  The 
participants’ task is to select the character that the speaker describes (the Target).  
While Targets are unambiguously identified by pronoun gender, adjective valence 
(combined with context) can provide an earlier cue.  When the ironic speaker speaks, 
fixations to the target referent reveal the extent to which frequency guides early 
interpretation.  To briefly foreshadow the results, the overall magnitude of Target 
looks is greater for literal utterances compared to ironic ones, but there is no effect of 
frequency on magnitude of looks.  In contrast, the rate of interpretation is higher for 
ironic criticisms than ironic compliments.  
It is important to note here that prosody was not manipulated in this 
experiment (or in any subsequent experiments).  The literal recordings for one list 
became the ironic recordings for another, and so participants heard the same audio 
files regardless of whether the speaker was literal or ironic.  The speakers were told to 
use an enthusiastic tone, which was potentially consistent with irony but not 
inconsistent with literal utterances.  It was not expected that using the same prosody 
for ironic and literal utterances would be problematic, given evidence that there may 
not be an “ironic tone of voice” (Attardo, Eisterhold, Hay, & Poggi, 2003; Bryant & 
Fox Tree, 2005; Kreuz & Roberts, 1995; Rockwell, 2000) and that listeners do not 
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rely on particular vocal cues to identify verbal irony (Bryant & Fox Tree, 2005).  
Indeed, Cutler (1974) wrote that, “if cues from the context are strong enough, no 
intonational cues are necessary” (p. 117).  Furthermore, Kreuz and Roberts (1995) 
argue that an ironic tone of voice might even be detrimental to comprehension when 
there is high common ground between the speaker and listener.  However, it is 
possible that if speakers were specifically asked to sound ironic, it would alter the 
results presented here.  If it is the case that there are particular acoustic cues to irony 
that are not captured here, it could mean that the present results might not generalize 
to those circumstances. 
Experiments 2A and 2B follow up on Experiment 1 to test whether 
participants are actually generating the pragmatic inferences necessary for irony 
comprehension.  It is possible for participants to complete the task while only 
computing truth conditions (e.g., always do the opposite of what the speaker said), 
rather than considering speaker goals.  In Experiment 2A, the ironic speaker is 
replaced with a speaker who always “says the opposite” of what he/she means.  Thus, 
while the truth conditions of the utterances are the same, the pragmatic inferences 
required for interpretation are not.  If delays from Experiment 1 are generated by all 
non-literal interpretations, then the same effects found in Experiment 1 should be 
found in Experiment 2A.  However, if delays found in Experiment 1 are specific to 
irony (where pragmatic inferences are necessary), the patterns should not hold in 
Experiment 2A.  These findings suggest that the observed delays are in fact specific 
to irony.  In Experiment 2B, I evaluate the social-pragmatic functions of irony by 
examining the inferences that comprehenders make about ironic speakers and their 
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goals.  This experiment differentiates inferences made about opposite speakers and 
ironic speakers (who also say the opposite of what they mean, but do so for a social 
pragmatic purpose).  The results indicate that comprehenders draw different 
conclusions about ironic speakers than opposite speakers, thereby corroborating the 
different patterns of findings of Experiments 1 and 2A. 
Experiments 3 and 4 test the source of delays for irony comprehension found 
in Experiment 1.  In syntactic processing, the simultaneous activation of two 
interpretations leads to conflict that consequently engages cognitive control (Hsu & 
Novick, 2016; Kan et al., 2013).  Irony may behave like syntactic ambiguity, in which 
case comprehending irony would generate conflict and lead to the engagement of 
cognitive control.  The engagement of cognitive control would then facilitate 
performance on a subsequent cognitive control task.  This is tested in Experiment 3.   
In Experiment 4 I examine whether the delay for irony comprehension can be 
mitigated by the prior engagement of cognitive control.  This would again be similar 
to findings for syntactic ambiguity (Hsu & Novick, 2016). 
Taken together, these four experiments will help us to better understand how 
comprehenders process irony as well as the semantics-pragmatics interface more 
broadly.  In particular, these experiments address some of the prior limitations to 
previous work by (a) using a fine-grained measure of time course, (b) examining 
frequent criticisms as well as infrequent compliments, (c) comparing ironic utterances 
to appropriate literal baselines, and (d) providing participants strong context to better 




Chapter 2: Experiment 1 
Overview 
In order to compare the Early Access and Late Access accounts, the present 
chapter examines how frequency and context interact over time in verbal irony 
comprehension.  This issue may be informed by work on word recognition, where 
context and frequency inform comprehenders’ real-time processing decisions (Duffy 
et al., 1988; Swinney, 1979).  In a seminal study on homophones, Swinney (1979) 
found that even when context biased toward one meaning of a homophone, both 
meanings were activated early in processing.  However, only the relevant meaning 
remained activated given a delay.  These findings suggest that context does not have 
an immediate effect on lexical access, but instead only plays a role in a post-access 
decision process, where one of the two activated meanings is selected.  This could 
similarly be the case for irony: both the literal and ironic meanings could be accessed 
initially, and context (e.g., about speaker goals or identity) might only play a role later 
to select the relevant ironic interpretation.  Duffy et al. (1988) compared equibiased 
homophones, where both meanings are equally frequent (e.g., “pitcher”), to non-
equibiased homophones, where one meaning is more frequent than the other (e.g., 
“port”).  They found that, given a strong preceding context, only the relevant meaning 
of an equibiased homophone was activated.  However, there was a slowdown when 
comprehenders were given context supporting the subordinate meaning of a non-
equibiased homophone, indicating that context led to competition between the two 
activated meanings.  Thus, both context and frequency play a role in processing 





Figure 2. Models of homophone processing for (A) equibiased and (B) non-
equibiased nouns given disambiguating context (bottom of diagram).  The thickness 
of the arrows represents the frequency of the interpretation.  For equibiased words, 
context selects the appropriate meaning immediately and there is no increase in 
processing time (green arrow).  For non-equibiased words, context supporting the 
subordinate meaning leads to the simultaneous activation of the dominant (relevant) 
meaning and the subordinate (irrelevant) meaning, thereby increasing processing time 
(red arrow).  Note: disambiguating context taken from Duffy et al. (1988). 
	
Findings from the word recognition literature may inform our understanding 
of how context and frequency interact during irony comprehension.  If processing 
irony is like processing homophones, and ironic representations are stored in the 
lexicon, then both context (e.g., speaker identity) and frequency (criticisms vs. 
compliments) should interact in processing, as in the Early Access account.  Because 
criticisms are more frequent, providing strong contextual support should speed up 
processing time.  However, because ironic compliments are less frequent, they should 
be slower than criticisms even with context.  On the other hand, it is possible that 
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irony will not be processed in the same way as homophones, and that context will 
only be taken into account late in processing (Late Access account).  This would 
indicate that irony is not stored in the lexicon.  In this case, the frequency of irony 
will not affect comprehension speed: frequent ironic criticisms and less frequent 
ironic criticisms will both be accessed equally slowly.  Because both ironic criticisms 
and compliments must go through the literal interpretation, even adding strong 
contextual support should not facilitate processing. 
There are several requirements for an experiment that could distinguish 
between the Early and Late Access accounts.  First, it is necessary to use a fine-
grained measure of time course, such as a visual world eye-tracking paradigm.  The 
visual world eye-tracking paradigm is highly sensitive to probabilistic information 
about language use and context (e.g., Dahan, Magnuson, & Tanenhaus, 2001; 
Tanenhaus, Spivey-Knowlton, Eberhard, & Sedivy, 1995; Spivey, Tanenhaus, 
Eberhard, & Sedivy, 2002).  For example, Tanenhaus and colleagues (1995) showed 
that relevant non-linguistic information (e.g., a listener’s visuo-contextual 
environment) immediately informs real-time reference resolution.  A listener’s eye 
movements are closely time-locked to incoming speech, providing important 
temporal information about listeners’ ongoing interpretation commitments that can 
shed light on the underlying mental architecture that supports language 
comprehension.  Thus, this method is capable of assessing how listeners consult 
context and frequency information during the real-time interpretations of irony. 
In addition, the experiment would need to provide context to sufficiently 
distinguish between ironic and literal utterances.  One way to do this would be to 
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introduce a literal speaker and an ironic speaker.  Prior work indicates that listeners 
can use speaker identity and linguistic tendencies to aid in reference resolution 
(Arnold, Hudson Kam, & Tanenhaus, 2007; Grodner & Sedivy, in press; Nappa & 
Arnold, 2014) and pragmatic inference interpretation (Bergen & Grodner, 2012).  
Furthermore, explicit information about the speaker has been shown to influence real-
time interpretation commitments.  For example, Arnold, Pancani, and Rosa (in press) 
showed that when a speaker is described as being distracted, listeners rely less heavily 
on acoustic prominence to determine whether a referent has previously been 
mentioned or is new to the conversation.  Similarly, Arnold and colleagues (2007) 
had participants complete a reference resolution task while listening to instructions 
from a disfluent speaker.  Listeners were biased to interpret the referred to object as 
unfamiliar when the speaker was disfluent.  However, when the speaker was 
described as having object agnosia that caused difficulty with naming objects, the 
unfamiliarity bias was reduced.  There is also evidence that comprehenders make use 
of explicit information about a speaker’s occupation in deciding whether an utterance 
is meant ironically as well as in recalling the utterance later (Katz & Pexman, 1997; 
Pexman & Olineck, 2002).  
Finally, this experiment needs to manipulate the frequency of irony.  Whether 
irony is stored in the lexicon (like homophones) can be assessed by testing how 
frequency modulates interpretation speed.  Thus, the experiment must include both 
ironic criticisms as well as ironic compliments.  This can be achieved by 
manipulating the adjective valence.  The use of positive adjectives would indicate an 
ironic criticism (e.g., “what a fabulous chef he is”), while negative adjectives would 
 23 
 
indicate ironic compliments (e.g., “what a terrible chef she is”).  In addition, the time 
course of interpretation for these two types of utterances would need to be compared 
to appropriate baselines.  This is because negative words (e.g., “terrible”) tend to be 
interpreted more slowly than positive ones (e.g., “fabulous”; Kuchinke et al., 2005; 
Schact & Sommer, 2009).  Thus, the experiment must also include literal uses of 
positive and negative adjectives. 
The goal of Experiment 1 was to distinguish between the Early Access and 
Late Access accounts.  To do so, participants were presented with vignettes 
describing visually depicted events featuring two different-gender characters (Figure 
3) while their eye movements were tracked.  For example, Sally baked a beautiful 
cake while Fred made a mess.  Next, subjects heard an utterance that described Fred 
or Sally using a positive or negative adjective.  The participants’ task was to select the 
character that the speaker described (Target character).  Participants were told that 
these target utterances could be produced by one of two speakers: an ironic speaker 
and a literal speaker.  The ironic and literal speakers were disambiguated by gender 
so that participants could determine whether the utterance was ironic or literal as soon 




Figure 3. Example display for Experiments 1 and 2A. 
Continuing with the example used earlier, the ironic speaker would say either 
(a) “What a fabulous chef he is” or (b) “What a terrible chef she is.”  Utterance (a) 
would constitute an ironic criticism, while (b) would constitute an ironic compliment.  
The literal speaker would say either (c) “What a fabulous chef she is” or (d) “What a 
terrible chef he is.”  In addition to generating the irony frequency manipulation 
(criticisms vs. compliments), both positive and negative adjectives were used 
because, as described above, negative words (e.g., “terrible”) tend to be interpreted 
more slowly than positive ones (e.g., “fabulous”; Kuchinke et al., 2005; Schact & 
Sommer, 2009).  Thus, any delays observed for ironic compliments could not simply 
be attributed to the use of a negative adjective. 
While Targets were unambiguously identified by pronoun gender, adjective 
valence could provide an earlier cue.  Critically, when the literal speaker speaks, 
participants should look to Sally shortly after “fabulous” and Fred after “terrible.”  
However, looks to Fred should be delayed compared to looks to Sally, given evidence 
that negative words are interpreted more slowly than positive words.  Importantly, 
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when the ironic speaker speaks, fixations to the target referent will reveal the extent 
to which frequency guides early interpretation.  
Method 
Participants 
Thirty-five undergraduates from the University of Maryland participated in 
this experiment for either pay ($5) or course credit.  One participant’s data were not 
analyzed due to equipment malfunction, and two more participants were excluded due 
to low task accuracy (under 75% for one or more conditions).  Thus, there were a 
total of 32 participants included in the analyses (27 female, mean age = 19.3, range = 
18-22). 
Materials and procedure 
Participants were seated in front of a computer and their eye movements were 
recorded.  At the beginning of the experiment, participants were told that on each 
trial, they would hear brief stories describing two characters, Fred and Sally.  For 
example, Sally baked a beautiful cake while Fred made a mess.  These descriptions 
were accompanied by images on the screen depicting the events (Figure 3).  Then, 
participants would hear a new speaker describe of the two characters using a positive 
or negative adjective (“What a fabulous/terrible chef s/he is”).  One speaker would 
always be ironic and one speaker would always be literal.  Their task was to select the 
character that the speaker described (Target character).  See Appendix A for the 
complete task instructions.  Prior to beginning the experiment, participants completed 
three practice trials (two literal, one ironic). 
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The experiment employed a 2 x 2 x 2 design, with adjective valence (positive, 
negative) and interpretation type (literal, ironic) as within-subjects factors, and 
speaker gender (ironic male and literal female; ironic female and literal male) as a 
between-subjects factor (Table 1).  Participants saw a total of twenty critical items.  
Four versions of each critical item were generated by manipulating the interpretation 
type (ironic or literal) and the adjective valence (positive or negative).  This generated 
four presentation lists, such that each list contained five items in each condition 
(positive literal, positive ironic, negative literal, negative ironic), and each item 
appeared once in each list.  For example, one participant would hear “What a 
fabulous chef he is,” another would hear “What a fabulous chef she is,” a third would 
hear “What a terrible chef he is,” and a fourth would hear “What a terrible chef she 
is.”  See Appendix B for a list of all critical items.  An additional 24 filler trials were 
constructed in which both characters were either successful or unsuccessful at a given 
action.  Therefore, for filler items, participants could not identify the Target until the 




Display Crosses Adjective Valence, Interpretation, and Speaker Gender 
  Positive adjective (“fabulous chef”) 
 Negative adjective 
(“terrible chef”) 
Literal interpretation   (a) Positive Target  (b) Negative Target 
Ironic interpretation  (c) Negative Target  (d) Positive Target 
Note. (c) is an ironic criticism and (d) is an ironic compliment.  For half the subjects 
(n = 16), the male speaker was ironic and the female speaker was literal; for the other 




Four additional lists were generated by manipulating the speaker gender.  For 
half of the participants, the male speaker was ironic and the female speaker was 
literal.  For the other half, the female speaker was ironic and the male speaker was 
literal.  The same recordings were used, regardless of speaker identity.  That is, the 
recordings for the four lists where the male speaker was ironic were also used for the 
four lists where the male speaker was literal.  The speakers who pre-recorded the 
literal and ironic statements were instructed to use an enthusiastic tone of voice, 
which was felicitous with an ironic interpretation, but did not preclude a literal one.  
Therefore, all participants heard the same recordings.  All of the recordings were 
produced using a Shure SM-51 microphone in a sound-attenuated room.  It was not 
expected that using the same prosody for ironic and literal utterances would be 
problematic, given evidence that there is no ironic tone of voice (Attardo et al., 2003; 
Bryant & Fox Tree, 2005; Kreuz & Roberts, 1995; Rockwell, 2000) and that listeners 
do not rely on particular vocal cues to identify verbal irony (Bryant & Fox Tree, 
2005).   
Analysis 
Eye movements were divided into three time regions of interest: 
(1) Pre-adjective: The pre-adjective region began at the onset of the critical 
utterance and ended just before the onset of the adjective (e.g., “What a”).  
This region served as a baseline measure of looks to the display before any 
adjective or pronoun information.  In this region there should be 
approximately equal fixations to the Target and Distractor characters. 
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(2) Adjective-noun: The adjective-noun region began at the onset of the 
adjective and ended just before the onset of the pronoun (e.g., “fabulous 
chef”).  In this region, the comparison between the four conditions would 
reveal the reveal the extent to which frequency guides early interpretation.  
It was expected that in the literal condition, fixations to the Target would 
be faster for positive adjectives than negative ones.  For the ironic 
condition, there were two alternatives.  If context is used early and 
frequency mediates irony comprehension speed (Early Access account), 
then there should be an interaction between adjective, interpretation, and 
time, such that there would be a greater delay for ironic criticisms 
(compared to literal compliments) than there would be for ironic 
compliments (compared to literal criticisms).  However, if context is used 
late in processed and frequency does not mediate comprehension speed 
(Late Access account), then there should be no adjective by interpretation 
by time interaction.  That is, the delay for ironic criticisms and ironic 
compliments should be approximately equal as compared to the literal 
uses of those adjectives. 
(3) Pronoun: The pronoun region began at the onset of the critical utterance 
and ended at the offset of the statement (e.g., “he is”).  In this region, the 
Target character was unambiguously resolved by the gender of the 
pronoun.  Therefore, it was expected that looks to the Target would be 
greater than looks to the Distractor, regardless of condition.  
 29 
 
For each region, looks prior to 200ms were removed to account for the time it 
takes to launch a saccade (Allopenna, Magnuson, & Tanenhaus, 1998; Matin, Shao, 
& Boff, 1993).  In addition, all incorrect trials (i.e., where the subject did not click on 
the Target) were removed from analysis; this corresponded to 1.93% of all trials.  I 
coded the two characters as Target (who the speaker described) and Distractor (the 
other character on the screen).  The primary dependent measure examined the 
proportion of looks to the Target, which was calculated as Target looks divided by 
Target plus Distractor looks.  The proportion of looks to the Target was averaged 
across 50ms windows.   
Target looks were analyzed in R (version 3.3.2; R Core Team, 2016) with 
linear mixed effects models using the lme4 package (version 1.1-12; Bates, Maechler, 
Bolker, & Walker, 2015).  The lmerTest package was used to compute p-values using 
Satterthwaite’s approximation for denominator degrees of freedom (version 2.0-32; 
Kuznetsova, Bruun Brockhoff, & Haubo Bojesen Christensen, 2015).  For each 
region, a linear effects model was constructed containing adjective valence (positive, 
negative), interpretation type (literal, ironic), and time from adjective onset (in 50ms 
bins) as fixed effects.  (I additionally constructed a model including time, adjective, 
and speaker gender for ironic trials only.  The goal of this analysis was to ensure that 
listeners did not interpret irony differently when it was produced by a male speaker 
versus a female one.  However, since there was no significant three-way interaction 
[p = .36], speaker gender was not included in any further analyses.)  Adjective 
valence and interpretation type were both deviation coded, while time was included 
as a continuous factor.  For the adjective-noun region, an additional model was 
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constructed that only included adjective valence (positive, negative) and 
interpretation type (literal, ironic) to better understand the overall, time-independent 
magnitude differences. 
For all analyses, I first fit maximal models that included both random slopes 
and intercepts for subjects and items (Barr, Levy, Scheepers, & Tily, 2013).  
However, when the maximal models did not converge, I constructed all lower-level 
models that did converge and compared these models using a chi-square likelihood 
ratio test.  The model with the lowest Akaike’s information criterion (AIC) value was 
deemed the best-fitting model and was then used for analysis.  
Results 
Figure 4 plots the average looks to the Target over time during each region of 
interest (pre-adjective, adjective-noun, and pronoun) by condition (positive literal, 
positive ironic, negative literal, negative ironic).  Figure 5 plots the average looks to 
the Target, collapsing across time, during each region of interest by condition.  As the 
two figures show, the mean proportion of looks to the Target during the pre-adjective 
region was 0.49 (SE = 0.08).  The linear model parameters for the pre-adjective 
region are shown in Table 2.  As expected, there were no significant main effects or 




Figure 4. Average proportion of looks to the Target character in 50-ms intervals post-
adjective onset by region (pre-adjective, adjective-noun, pronoun), adjective valence 
(positive, negative), and interpretation type (literal, ironic).  The first vertical line 
represents the adjective onset and the second vertical line represents the average onset 





































































































Figure 5. Mean proportion of looks to Target character in by region (pre-adjective, 
adjective-noun, pronoun) and condition (positive literal, positive ironic, negative 
literal, negative ironic).  Bars represent standard errors. 
 
Table 2 
Model Parameters for Pre-Adjective Region: Exp. 1 
 Parameters 
Factor β  SE  t  p 
Intercept 0.50  0.03  17.41  < .0001 
Adjective -0.02  0.03  0.87  .39 
Interpretation -0.02  0.03  0.92  .36 
Time 0.00  0.00  -0.13  .90 
Adjective x Interpretation 0.03  0.05  -0.53  .60 
Adjective x Time -0.01  0.01  -0.85  .40 
Interpretation x Time -0.00  0.01  -0.03  .97 
Adjective x Interpretation x Time 0.01  0.01  1.44  .15 
Note. Model specification: TargetLooks ~ Adjective * Interpretation * Time + 
(1|Subject) + (1|Item)  
 
As described above, two linear mixed effects models were constructed for the 





































looks by adjective and interpretation (Table 3, Figure 5).  As the table and figure 
show, the proportion of looks to the Target during the critical adjective-noun region 
was significantly higher when the adjective was positive versus negative (0.62 vs. 
0.55).  This was confirmed by a significant main effect of adjective, F(1, 580.51) = 
8.42, p < .01.  Thus, consistent with prior work on semantic analysis (Kuchinke et al., 
2005; Schact & Sommer, 2009), access to positive adjectives was faster than negative 
adjectives.  In addition, the proportion of Target looks was significantly higher when 
the interpretation was literal versus ironic (0.63 vs. 0.55).  This was also confirmed by 
a significant main effect of interpretation, F(1, 580.56) = 10.57, p < .01.  There was 
no interaction between adjective and interpretation (p = .24).  Thus, looks to the 
Target were decreased for ironic utterances compared to literal ones, regardless of 
irony frequency. 
Table 3 
Model Parameters for Adjective-Noun Region without Time: Exp. 1	
 Parameters 
Factor β  SE  t  p 
Intercept 0.59  0.02  32.99  < .0001 
Adjective -0.07  0.03  -2.90  < .01 
Interpretation -0.08  0.03  -3.25  < .01 
Adjective x Interpretation -0.06  0.05  -1.19  .24 
Note. Model specification: TargetLooks ~ Adjective * Interpretation + (1|Subject) + 
(1|Item) 
 
The parameters for the model including adjective, interpretation, and time are 
shown in Table 4.  As can be seen in Table 4 and Figure 4, the proportion of looks to 
the Target increased over time across all conditions during the adjective-noun region.  
This was confirmed by a significant main effect of time, F(1, 16,684) = 358.78, p < 
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.0001.  In addition, there was a significant interaction between interpretation and 
time: looks to the Target increased more quickly for literal utterances compared to 
ironic ones, F(1, 16,668) = 13.44, p < .001.  Importantly, there was a significant 
interaction between adjective, interpretation, and time, F(1, 16,671) = 14.00, p < .001.  
To better explore this three-way interaction, I generated two additional linear mixed 
effects models: one with positive adjectives only and one with negative adjectives 
only.  For the positive adjective model, there was no interaction between 
interpretation and time (p = .83).  Thus, looks to the Target increased at 
approximately the same rate for positive adjectives used literally and positive 
adjectives used ironically.  In contrast, the negative adjective model revealed a 
significant time by interpretation interaction, F(1, 8,040.6) = 26.19, p < .0001.  In 
other words, negative ironic utterances (i.e., less frequent compliments) were delayed 
compared to negative literal utterances.  Taken together, these results show no effect 
of irony frequency in the magnitude of Target looks, but a significant effect of 
frequency on the rate of increase of Target looks.   
Table 4 
Model Parameters for Adjective-Noun Region with Time: Exp. 1	
 Parameters 
Factor β  SE  t  p 
Intercept 0.48  0.02  28.39  < .0001 
Adjective -0.09  0.03  -3.15  < .01 
Interpretation -0.04  0.01  -3.17  < .01 
Time 0.01  0.00  18.13  < .0001 
Adjective x Interpretation 0.04  0.03  1.69  .09 
Adjective x Time 0.00  0.00  1.77  .08 
Interpretation x Time -0.00  0.00  -3.61  < .001 
Adjective x Interpretation x Time -0.01  0.00  -3.96  < .0001 
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Note. Model specification: TargetLooks ~ Adjective * Interpretation * Time + 
(1|Subject) + (1|Item) + (1+Adjective|Subject) 
 
By the pronoun region, participants had largely converged on the Target 
across conditions: the proportion of looks to the Target was greater than 85% in all 
conditions.  The complete modeling results are shown in Table 5.  As in the adjective-
noun region, there was a significant interaction between adjective, interpretation, and 
time, F(1, 10,593) = 9.13, p < .01.  This appears to be driven by the fact that Target 
looks for the negative ironic condition were greater than looks for the negative literal 
condition, while Target looks in the positive ironic condition were not consistently 
different from looks in the positive literal condition.   
Table 5 
Model Parameters for Pronoun Region: Exp. 1 
 Parameters 
Factor β  SE  t  p 
Intercept 0.50  0.02  20.83  < .0001 
Adjective -0.28  0.04  -7.00  < .0001 
Interpretation -0.26  0.03  -7.73  < .0001 
Time 0.01  0.00  21.34  < .0001 
Adjective x Interpretation -0.20  0.07  -3.02  < .01 
Adjective x Time 0.01  0.00  7.58  < .0001 
Interpretation x Time 0.01  0.00  7.70  < .0001 
Adjective x Interpretation x Time 0.01  0.00  3.02  < .01 
Note. Model specification: TargetLooks ~ Adjective * Interpretation * Time + 
(1|Subject) + (1|Item) + (1+Adj|Item)  
Discussion 
Prior work on irony leaves open critical questions regarding how frequency 
and context are used over time during verbal comprehension.  According to the Early 
Access account, context and frequency interact early during processing.  Thus, more 
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frequent ironic criticisms should be processed more quickly (relative to their literal 
baselines) than less frequent ironic compliments.  However, according to the Late 
Access account, context is only taken into account later in processing.  Therefore, 
irony frequency should not modulate comprehension speed: frequent ironic criticisms 
and less frequent ironic criticisms should be accessed equally slowly. 
The data from this experiment show that in terms of the overall magnitude of 
Target looks, irony frequency does not mediate interpretation.  Target looks were 
lower for ironic utterances compared to literal ones, regardless of irony frequency.  
However, the rate analyses indicate that the speed with which ironic utterances are 
processed is mediated by their frequency.  Comprehenders were slower to reach the 
less conventional use of irony (compliments) than the more conventional use 
(criticisms), compared to their literal baselines.  When irony was used in its more 
conventional form, there was no difference in the rate of Target looks compared to 
the literal condition. 
These findings do not seem to definitively support the Early or Late Access 
accounts.  While irony frequency had an early effect on the rate of Target looks, it did 
not affect the overall magnitude.  This seems to suggest that overall, ironic utterances 
are interpreted more slowly than literal utterances.  This is in line with prior work on 
irony processing indicating that ironic utterances take longer to comprehend (Filik & 
Moxey, 2010; Schwoebel, Dews, Winner, & Srinivas, 2000).  However, using the 
more frequent form of irony (criticisms) benefits interpretation speed to a greater 
degree than less frequent forms of irony (compliments). 
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The present experiment builds on prior work in two key ways.  First, the 
context provided to participants was very strong.  Participants were told in advance 
that one speaker would always be ironic, thereby generating a perfectly reliable cue.  
Thus, the delay observed for irony could not be attributed to insufficient contextual 
support.  (And indeed, participant performance did not change over the course of the 
experiment: in an analysis including adjective, interpretation, and half, there was no 
three-way interaction [p = .41].  Participants did not make better use of the speaker 
identity cue in the second half compared to the first.)  Second, the present experiment 
manipulated frequency.  The rate of interpretation was modulated by irony frequency, 
suggesting that prior work that ignored irony frequency may not have accurately 
captured the time course of irony comprehension.  
The patterns found here differ from those for other instances where multiple 
meanings are linked to a single phonological form, such as homophones.  For 
homophones, frequency and context interact early during processing  (Duffy et al., 
1988).  While the present experiment showed early frequency effects in the rate of 
irony interpretation, comprehenders’ use of contextual information (i.e., speaker 
identity) did not boost the magnitude of ironic interpretations to the same level as 
literal interpretations.  One possible reason for this discrepancy is the level of 
representations involved.  For homophones, both potential meanings exist at the 
lexical level (e.g., “bank” for the financial institution and “bank” for the side of the 
river).  In contrast, the two possible meanings present for irony occur across different 
levels of representation: the semantic analysis (literal interpretation) and the 
pragmatic analysis (ironic interpretation).  It is possible that context can only be used 
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early in processing when the multiple meanings to be disambiguated operate at the 
same level of linguistic representation, as for homophones. 
Importantly, it is possible that participants in this experiment were not 
necessarily computing the ironic interpretations.  That is, rather than treating the 
ironic speaker as ironic, participants could treat the speaker as always saying the 
opposite of what they mean.  Thus, instead of generating a pragmatic inference about 
ironic speaker and their reason for being ironic, the participant could simply choose 
the character that is consistent with the opposite of “fabulous chef.”  Indeed, irony is 
often defined as simply saying the opposite of what you mean.  However, irony 
carries certain pragmatic functions that saying the opposite does not, such as being 
polite (Attardo, 2001; Dews & Winner, 1995; Jorgensen, 1996) or humorous (Dews 
et al.,1995; Gibbs et al., 2014; Kumon-Nakamura et al., 1995; Matthews et al., 2006).   
If listeners in the present experiment were simply accessing the opposite meaning, but 
not the pragmatic interpretation, then the present experiment would not tell us 
anything about irony comprehension.  It is therefore important to determine whether 
listeners did actually draw the pragmatic inference for ironic utterances in this 
experiment. 
Experiment 2A seeks to address this potential limitation by comparing the 
present results to those obtained for an “opposite” speaker.  The exact same 
paradigm, materials, and procedure from Experiment 1 were used in Experiment 2A, 
except that instead of one speaker always being ironic, that speaker was described as 
always saying the opposite of what he/she meant.  If the patterns in Experiment 2A 
are the same as those observed in Experiment 1, then we can conclude that the 
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Experiment 1 participants were not computing the pragmatic inferences typically 
involved in irony comprehension.  However, if the eye movement patterns are 
different, it means that the participants in Experiment 1 were not just doing the 
opposite of what the ironic speaker said.  Experiment 2B further addressed this issue 
by examining the pragmatic inferences comprehenders make about ironic speakers vs. 
opposite speakers.  The goal of this experiment was to determine whether listeners 
draw pragmatic inferences about ironic speakers that differ from those for opposite 
speakers.  If this difference exists, it would provide additional evidence that irony is 
more than just computing opposites, and that the listeners in Experiment 1 were 





Chapter 3: Experiments 2A and 2B 
Overview 
As described above, the participants in Experiment 1 were slower to 
comprehend ironic criticisms compared to ironic compliments.  Thus, frequency 
modulated the speed of ironic interpretations.  However, the findings are also 
potentially consistent with the idea that the participants were simply “doing the 
opposite” of what the ironic speaker said, rather than computing the pragmatic 
inferences involved in irony comprehension.  As a result, it may be the case that the 
delay for irony and the existence of a frequency effect are simply due to 
comprehenders computing opposites, not irony.  Experiments 2A and 2B were 
therefore conducted to test whether listeners in the current paradigm interpret the 
ironic utterances as ironic, not just as opposites.  
Experiment 2A sought to determine whether the categorical manipulation of 
speakers (speakers are either always literal or always ironic) led participants to use 
strategies, such as always doing the opposite of what the ironic speaker says, rather 
than actually computing the pragmatic inference generated by irony.  Experiment 2A 
was identical to Experiment 1, except that the ironic speaker was replaced with a 
speaker who always said “the opposite” of what he/she actually meant.  If the 
participants in Experiment 1 were just doing the opposite of what the ironic speaker 
said, then it was expected that Experiment 2A would replicate the findings from 
Experiment 1.  That is, there would be a delay for opposites that would be modulated 
by frequency.  However, if comprehending ironic utterances requires pragmatic 
processes beyond simply computing the truth value (e.g., considering speaker goals), 
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then there would be a different time course for the opposite conditions in Experiment 
2A compared to the ironic conditions in Experiment 1.  In particular, while there 
might still be a delay for opposite utterances compared to literal ones, there would not 
be an effect of frequency. 
The goal of Experiment 2B was to determine the inferences that 
comprehenders make about speakers who say the opposite of what they mean 
(opposite speakers), compared to speakers who also say the opposite of what they 
mean, but do so for a social pragmatic purpose (ironic speakers).  Thus, this 
experiment sought to further test whether comprehenders view ironic speakers in the 
same way as opposite speakers.  To do so, participants were shown brief videos 
constructed from Experiments 1 and 2A.  That is, Fred and Sally were shown 
completing various actions and then a speaker described one of the two characters.  
Half of the participants were told that one speaker would always be literal and the 
other would always be ironic, and the other half were told that one speaker would 
always be literal and the other would always say the opposite of what he/she meant.  
As in Experiments 1 and 2A, the speakers were disambiguated by gender. 
After viewing four videos with each speaker (four literal plus four ironic, or 
four literal plus four opposite), the participants were asked to rate each speaker on six 
adjectives: critical, polite, matter-of-fact, aggressive, confusing, and weird.  These 
adjectives were selected to represent potential goals or communicative functions for 
each linguistic form.  Thus, ironic speakers were expected to be rated highly on 
critical and polite, literal speakers were expected to be rated highly on matter-of-fact 
and aggressive, and opposite speakers were expected to be rated highly on confusing 
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and weird.  The degree to which the participants’ ratings differed for ironic and 
opposite speakers would reveal the different inferences listeners make about ironic 
and opposite speakers.  
Experiment 2A Method 
Participants 
Thirty-nine undergraduates from the University of Maryland participated in 
this experiment for either pay ($5) or course credit.  Seven participants were excluded 
due to low task accuracy (under 75% for one or more conditions).  Thus, there were a 
total of 32 participants included in the analyses (22 female, mean age = 19.8, range = 
18-22). 
Materials and procedure 
Participants completed the same task in Experiment 2A as they did in 
Experiment 1, except that the ironic speaker was replaced with an “opposite” speaker 
who always said the opposite of what they meant.  The same recordings were used as 
in Experiment 1.  As in Experiment 1, participants completed three practice trials 
(two literal, one opposite) before beginning the experiment. 
Analysis 
Analysis was performed in the same way as in Experiment 1.  As in 
Experiment 1, all incorrect trials (i.e., where the subject did not click on the Target) 
were removed from analysis; this corresponded to 1.87% of all trials. 
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Experiment 2A Results 
Figure 6 plots the average looks to the Target over time during each region of 
interest (pre-adjective, adjective-noun, and pronoun) by condition (positive literal, 
positive opposite, negative literal, and negative opposite).  Figure 7 plots the average 
looks to the Target during each region of interest (pre-adjective, adjective-noun, and 
pronoun) by condition (positive literal, positive opposite, negative literal, and 
negative opposite).  As the two figures show, the mean proportion of looks to the 
Target during the pre-adjective region was 0.49 (SE = 0.09).  The linear model 
parameters for the pre-adjective region are shown in Table 6.  All main effects and 
interactions were non-significant except for a time by adjective interaction, F(1, 
4,402.2) = 5.35, p < .05.  This was unexpected, as there was no adjective information 
available in this region.  However, as shown in Figure 6, any differences between 
conditions were resolved prior to the adjective onset. 
 
Figure 6. Average proportion of looks to the Target character in 50-ms intervals post-
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(positive, negative), and interpretation type (literal, opposite).  The first vertical line 
represents the adjective onset and the second vertical line represents the average onset 
time of the pronoun. Bars represent standard errors. 
	
 
Figure 7. Mean proportion of looks to Target character in by region (pre-adjective, 
adjective-noun, pronoun) and condition (positive literal, positive opposite, negative 
literal, negative opposite).  Bars represent standard errors. 
 
Table 6 
Model Parameters for Pre-Adjective Region: Exp. 2A 
 Parameters 
Factor β  SE  t  p 
Intercept 0.48  0.03  16.86  < .0001 
Adjective -0.02  0.04  -0.53  .60 
Interpretation -0.01  0.02  -0.52  .60 
Time 0.00  0.00  1.19  .23 
Adjective x Interpretation 0.07  0.05  1.37  .17 
Adjective x Time -0.01  0.01  -2.31  .02 
Interpretation x Time 0.01  0.01  1.63  .10 
Adjective x Interpretation x Time -0.01  0.01  -0.74  .46 
Note. Model specification: TargetLooks ~ Adjective * Interpretation + (1|Subject) + 






































As in Experiment 1, two linear mixed effects models were constructed for the 
adjective-noun region.  The parameters for the model including only adjective and 
interpretation for the adjective-noun region are shown in Table 7.  As the table shows, 
there were no significant main effects or interactions during this region (ps > .10).   
	
Table 7 
Model Parameters for Adjective-Noun Region without Time: Exp. 2A 
 
 Parameters 
Factor β  SE  t  p 
Intercept 0.57  0.01  42.63  < .0001 
Adjective -0.04  0.03  -1.45  .15 
Interpretation -0.04  0.03  -1.59  .11 
Adjective x Interpretation -0.02  0.05  -0.29  .78 
Note. Model specification: TargetLooks ~ Adjective * Interpretation + (1|Subject) + 
(1|Item) 
 
The parameters for the model including adjective, interpretation, and time are 
shown in Table 8.  As can be seen in Table 8 and Figure 6, the proportion of looks to 
the Target increased over time across all conditions during the adjective-noun region.  
This was confirmed by a significant main effect of time, F(1, 16,418) = 273.77, p < 
.0001.   Importantly, there was no significant interaction between adjective, 
interpretation, and time (p = 0.96).  That is, the difference between positive literal 
utterances and positive opposite utterances was equivalent to the difference between 
negative literal utterances and negative opposite utterances.  Thus, in contrast to the 





Model Parameters for Adjective-Noun Region with Time: Exp. 2A	
 Parameters 
Factor β  SE  t  p 
Intercept 0.47  0.02  24.84  < .0001 
Adjective -0.10  0.01  -6.88  < .0001 
Interpretation -0.02  0.01  -1.34  .17 
Time 0.01  0.00  16.55  < .0001 
Adjective x Interpretation -0.03  0.03  -1.03  .31 
Adjective x Time 0.01  0.00  5.06  < .0001 
Interpretation x Time -0.02  0.00  -2.69  .01 
Adjective x Interpretation x Time 0.00  0.00  0.05  .96 
Note. Model specification: TargetLooks ~ Adjective * Interpretation * Time + 
(1|Subject) + (1|Item) 
 
By the pronoun region, participants had largely converged on the Target 
across conditions: the proportion of looks to the Target was greater than 85% in all 
conditions.  The complete modeling results are shown in Table 9.  As in the adjective-
noun region, there was no interaction between adjective, interpretation, and time (p = 
0.41). 
Table 9 
Model Parameters for Pronoun Region: Exp. 2A	
 Parameters 
Factor β  SE  t  p 
Intercept 0.37  0.03  14.48  < .0001 
Adjective -0.05  0.05  -0.99  .32 
Interpretation -0.14  0.04  -4.07  < .0001 
Time 0.01  0.00  26.59  < .0001 
Adjective x Interpretation 0.10  0.07  1.44  .15 
Adjective x Time 0.00  0.00  1.35  .18 
Interpretation x Time 0.00  0.00  3.86  < .001 
Adjective x Interpretation x Time -0.00  0.00  -0.83  .41 
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Note. Model specification: TargetLooks ~ Adjective * Interpretation * Time + 
(1|Subject) + (1|Item) + (1+Adj|Item) 
 
An additional analysis was performed to compare the results from Experiment 
2A to the results from Experiment 1.  The goal of this analysis was to statistically test 
whether the difference between these two experiments was driven by the frequency 
effect observed in Experiment 1 that was not observed in Experiment 2A.  
Accordingly, a linear mixed effects model was constructed to compare Target looks 
on ironic trials (Exp. 1) to Target looks on opposite trials (Exp. 2A).  Experiment, 
time, and adjective were included as fixed effects and subject and item were included 
as random intercepts.  The results of this analysis revealed a significant three-way 
interaction between adjective, time, and experiment, F(1, 16,388) = 13.46, p < .001.  
This analysis lends further support to the claim that the frequency effect observed in 
Experiment 1 was not present in Experiment 2A, and thus that ironic interpretations 
do differ from opposite ones. 
Experiment 2B Method 
Participants 
A total of 192 native English speakers participated in the study through 
Amazon Mechanical Turk (68 female, 2 no response; mean age = 32.5, range = 19-
65).  Participants received $2 as compensation for their participation. 
Materials and procedure 
Participants were told that they would watch eight videos involving different 
characters, each of which showing events featuring two different-gender characters 
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(Fred and Sally).  Then participants would hear one of two speakers describe Fred or 
Sally using a positive or negative adjective.  One speaker would always be ironic (or 
opposite) and one speaker would always be literal (see Appendix C for full 
instructions).  The eight videos represented a subset of the critical items from 
Experiments 1 and 2A.  After viewing all eight videos, subjects were asked to rate 
each speaker on six adjectives.  For example, “On a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 is NOT 
very polite and 7 is very polite, how would you describe the female speaker?”  The 
six adjectives were: critical, polite, matter-of-fact, aggressive, confusing, and weird.  
The adjectives were selected to represent potential qualities associated with being 
ironic (polite or critical) and/or associated with saying the opposite of what one 
means (weird or confusing).   
The experiment employed a 2 x 2 x 2 design, with speaker group (A: literal 
and ironic speakers, B: literal and opposite speakers), interpretation (literal, non-
literal), and speaker gender (ironic male and literal female; literal male and ironic 
female) as between-subject factors.  The eight videos were rotated through four 
conditions: positive literal, positive ironic/opposite, negative literal, and negative 
ironic/opposite.  Crossing speaker group, interpretation, and speaker gender produced 
a total of sixteen lists.  Subjects were randomly assigned to lists, with an equal 
number per list. 
 It was expected that participants’ ratings of the speakers would differ by 
speaker group.  This would indicate that the inferences subjects are making about 




Participants’ ratings were analyzed in R (version 3.3.2; R Core Team, 2016) 
with linear mixed effects models using the lme4 package (version 1.1-12; Bates et al., 
2015).  A separate model was created for each of the six adjectives, with subject as 
random intercept and speaker group (A: literal and ironic speakers, B: literal and 
opposite speakers), speaker gender (male, female), and interpretation (literal, non-
literal) as fixed effects.  The lmerTest package was used to compute p-values using 
Satterthwaite’s approximation for denominator degrees of freedom (version 2.0-32; 
Kuznetsova et al., 2015). 
Experiment 2B Results 
Critical  
The mean ratings by adjective are shown in Figure 8 for Group A and in 
Figure 9 for Group B.  The model parameters for the adjective critical are shown in 
Table 10.  As the table shows, there was a significant main effect of group, such that 
Group A was rated as more critical overall (M = 4.70, SE = 0.12) compared to Group 
B (M = 4.32, SE = 0.13), F(1, 374) = 4.72, p < .05.  There was additionally a main 
effect of interpretation: non-literal speakers were rated as more critical (M = 4.72, SE 
= 0.12) than literal speakers (M = 4.30, SE = 0.13), F(1, 374) = 5.99, p < .05.  Finally, 
there was a significant interaction between interpretation and speaker gender, F(1, 
374) = 6.35, p < .05.  This appears to be driven by the fact that for literal speakers, 
males were judged as more critical than females (Mdiff = 0.59), whereas for non-literal 
speakers, females were judged as more critical than males (Mdiff = 0.29).  Importantly, 
there was no interaction between interpretation and speaker group.  Thus, the 
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difference between ironic and literal speakers (Mdiff = 0.45) was equivalent to the 
difference between opposite and literal speakers (Mdiff = 0.32). 
 
Figure 8. Mean ratings by adjective and speaker (literal and ironic) for Group A.  
Bars represent standard errors. 
 
 
Figure 9. Mean ratings by adjective and speaker (literal and opposite) for Group B.  
Bars represent standard errors. 
 
Table 10 
Model Parameters for Adjective “Critical”: Exp. 2B 
 Parameters 













































Intercept 4.51  0.09  51.90  < .0001 
Group -0.38  0.17  -2.17  .03 
Interpretation 0.43  0.17  2.45  .01 
Speaker Gender 0.15  0.17  0.84  .40 
Group x Interpretation 0.13  0.35  0.37  .71 
Group x Speaker Gender 0.06  0.35  0.18  .86 
Interpretation x Speaker Gender -0.88  0.35  -2.52  .01 
Group x Interpretation x Speaker 
Gender 
0.37  0.69  0.54  .59 
 
Polite 
The model parameters for the adjective polite are shown in Table 11.  As the 
table shows, there was a significant main effect of interpretation: literal speakers were 
rated as more matter-of-fact (M = 5.80, SE = 0.10) than non-literal speakers (M = 
3.03, SE = 0.14), F(1, 373) = 55.63, p < .0001.  There were no other significant main 
effects or interactions.  Thus, the difference in polite ratings between ironic and literal 
speakers (Mdiff = 1.26) was equivalent to the difference between opposite and literal 
speakers (Mdiff = 1.19). 
 
Table 11 
Model Parameters for Adjective “Polite”: Exp. 2B 
 Parameters 
Factor β  SE  t  p 
Intercept 3.79  0.08  46.14  < .0001 
Group 0.26  0.16  1.59  .11 
Interpretation -1.23  0.16  -7.56  < .0001 
Speaker Gender -0.28  0.16  -1.69  .09 
Group x Interpretation 0.07  0.33  0.21  .83 
Group x Speaker Gender 0.34  0.33  1.04  .30 
Interpretation x Speaker Gender 0.56  0.33  1.71  .09 
Group x Interpretation x Speaker 
Gender 




The model parameters for the adjective aggressive are shown in Table 12.  As 
the table shows, there was a significant main effect of interpretation: non-literal 
speakers were rated as more aggressive (M = 4.17, SE = 0.12) than literal speakers (M 
= 3.43, SE = 0.13), F(1, 374) = 18.01, p < .0001.  Additionally, there was a 
significant interaction between interpretation and speaker gender, F(1, 374) = 13.80, 
p < .001.  This appears to be driven by the fact that for literal speakers, males were 
judged as more aggressive than females (Mdiff = 0.84), whereas for non-literal 
speakers, females were judged as more critical than males (Mdiff = 0.44).  Importantly, 
there was no interaction between interpretation and speaker group.  Thus, the 
difference in aggressive ratings between ironic and literal speakers (Mdiff = 0.64) was 
equivalent to the difference between opposite and literal speakers (Mdiff = 0.84). 
Table 12 
Model Parameters for Adjective “Aggressive”: Exp. 2B 
 Parameters 
Factor β  SE  t  p 
Intercept 3.80  0.09  43.80  < .0001 
Group -0.06  0.17  -0.32  .75 
Interpretation 0.74  0.17  4.24  < .0001 
Speaker Gender 0.20  0.17  1.15  .25 
Group x Interpretation 0.20  0.35  0.58  .56 
Group x Speaker Gender -0.21  0.35  -0.59  .56 
Interpretation x Speaker Gender -1.29  0.35  -3.72  < .001 
Group x Interpretation x Speaker 
Gender 





The model parameters for the adjective confusing are shown in Table 13.  As 
the table shows, there was a significant main effect of interpretation, such that non-
literal speakers were rated as more confusing (M = 4.96, SE = 0.13) compared to 
literal speakers (M = 2.27, SE = 0.12).  There was additionally a main effect of 
speaker gender: female speakers were rated as more confusing (M = 3.85, SE = 0.16) 
than male speakers (M = 3.37, SE = 0.16).  Finally, there was a significant interaction 
between group and speaker gender, F(1, 375) = 6.92, p < .01.  This appears to be 
driven by the fact that the difference between literal and ironic speakers (Group A; 
Mdiff = 2.22) was greater than the difference between literal and opposite speakers 
(Group B; Mdiff = 3.17).  Thus, compared to their literal baselines, opposite speakers 
were judged as being more confusing than ironic speakers. 
Table 13 
Model Parameters for Adjective “Confusing”: Exp. 2B 
 Parameters 
Factor β  SE  t  p 
Intercept 3.61  0.09  40.42  < .0001 
Group 0.19  0.18  1.06  .29 
Interpretation 2.70  0.18  15.08  < .0001 
Speaker Gender -0.49  0.18  -2.73  .01 
Group x Interpretation 0.94  0.36  2.63  .01 
Group x Speaker Gender -0.65  0.36  -1.82  .07 
Interpretation x Speaker Gender -0.08  0.36  -0.22  .82 
Group x Interpretation x Speaker 
Gender 





The model parameters for the adjective weird are shown in Table 14.  As the 
table shows, there was a significant main effect of interpretation, such that non-literal 
speakers were rated as weirder (M = 4.77, SE = 0.12) compared to literal speakers (M 
= 2.73, SE = 0.12), F(1, 375) = 144.60, p < .0001.  There was additionally an 
interaction between interpretation and group, F(1, 375) = 14.85, p < .001.  This is 
driven by the fact that the difference between literal and ironic speakers (Group A; 
Mdiff = 1.38) was greater than the difference between literal and opposite speakers 
(Group B; Mdiff = 2.69).  Thus, compared to their literal baselines, opposite speakers 
were judged as being weirder than ironic speakers. 
Table 14 
Model Parameters for Adjective “Weird”: Exp. 2B 
 Parameters 
Factor β  SE  t  p 
Intercept 3.75  0.08  44.19  < .0001 
Group 0.29  0.17  1.74  .08 
Interpretation 2.04  0.17  12.03  < .0001 
Speaker Gender -0.03  0.17  -0.20  .84 
Group x Interpretation 1.31  0.34  3.85  < .001 
Group x Speaker Gender -0.59  0.34  -1.74  .08 
Interpretation x Speaker Gender -0.66  0.34  -1.95  .05 
Group x Interpretation x Speaker 
Gender 
0.05  0.68  0.08  .94 
 
Matter-of-fact  
The model parameters for the adjective matter-of-fact are shown in Table 15.  
As the table shows, there was a significant main effect of interpretation: literal 
speakers were rated as more matter-of-fact (M = 5.80, SE = 0.10) than non-literal 
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speakers (M = 3.03, SE = 0.14), F(1, 374) = 261.23, p < .0001.  There were no other 
significant main effects or interactions.  Thus, the difference in matter-of-fact ratings 
between ironic and literal speakers (Mdiff = 2.63) was equivalent to the difference 
between opposite and literal speakers (Mdiff = 2.91). 
Table 15 
Model Parameters for Adjective “Matter-of-fact”: Exp. 2B 
 Parameters 
Factor β  SE  t  p 
Intercept 4.42  0.09  51.51  < .0001 
Group -0.09  0.17  -0.55  .58 
Interpretation -2.77  0.17  -16.16  < .0001 
Speaker Gender -0.08  0.17  -0.48  .63 
Group x Interpretation -0.27  0.34  -0.80  .43 
Group x Speaker Gender 0.44  0.34  1.28  .20 
Interpretation x Speaker Gender -0.04  0.34  -0.12  .91 
Group x Interpretation x Speaker 
Gender 
-0.12  0.69  -0.18  .86 
 
Summary 
It is particularly important to note that there was a significant interaction 
between speaker group and interpretation only for the adjectives weird and confusing.  
Compared to literal speakers, subjects judged opposite speakers as being weirder than 
ironic speakers, F(1, 379) = 14.741, p < .001.  In addition, subjects rated opposite 
speakers as more confusing than ironic speakers, compared to literal speakers, F(1, 
379) = 6.803, p < .01.  These findings indicate that speakers make different inferences 
about ironic and opposite speakers.  When a speaker does not have a social pragmatic 
purpose for saying the opposite of what they mean, listeners find the speaker 
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confusing and weird (compared to ironic speakers, where there is a social pragmatic 
purpose). 
Of course, it is also possible that the explicit nature of the task elicited 
responses that comprehenders do not necessarily generate during real-time 
comprehension.  That is, it is possible that comprehenders need more time to draw 
conclusions about a speaker’s social pragmatic goals, or that explicitly judging a 
speaker is different from drawing implicit conclusions about their linguistic 
tendencies.  However, existing work indicates that comprehenders can make use of 
speaker identity information in real-time processing (Bergen & Grodner, 2012; 
Brown-Schmidt, Gunlogson, & Tanenhaus, 2008; Regel, Coulson, & Gunter, 2010; 
Van Berkum, van den Brink, Tesink, Kos, & Hagoort, 2008; Yildirim, Degen, 
Tanenhaus, & Jaeger, 2016), including more explicit speaker identity information 
(Arnold et al., in press; Gibbs et al., 1991; Grodner & Bergen, 2012; Katz & Pexman, 
1997; Pexman & Olineck, 2002).  Together, these data make this alternative 
explanation less likely.  Of course, it remains an empirical question that should be 
tested in future work. 
Discussion 
In Experiment 1, overall looks to the Target were lower for ironic utterances 
compared to literal ones, though the rate of increasing Target looks was modulated by 
frequency.  Importantly, it is possible that rather than computing the pragmatic 
inferences involved in irony comprehension, the participants were instead just doing 
the opposite of what the ironic speaker said.  The goal of Experiments 2A and 2B was 
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to test this by examining the time course of opposites interpretation (Exp. 2A) and 
comparing the inferences made about ironic vs. opposite speakers (Exp. 2B). 
The participants in Experiment 2A were slower to comprehend opposite 
compared to literal utterances.  More importantly, there was no interaction between 
adjective, interpretation, and time.  This finding conflicts with the results from 
Experiment 1, where there was an adjective by interpretation by time interaction.  The 
difference between Experiments 1 and 2A suggests that the data from Experiment 1 
do not simply reflect a strategy like computing the opposite of what the ironic speaker 
says.  Rather, the Experiment 1 eye movement data represent the time course of the 
pragmatic inference required for the interpretation of ironic utterances.  That is, 
listeners make inferences about ironic speaker goals that go above and beyond truth 
conditions, and the generation of these inferences is influenced by the frequency of 
interpretation.   
The goal of Experiment 2B was to determine whether listeners make different 
inferences about ironic and opposite speakers.  Observing such a difference would 
suggest that the participants in Experiment 1 were making inferences about the ironic 
speakers that differed from those made by participants in Experiment 2A about 
opposite speakers.  Indeed, the results from Experiment 2B indicate that listeners 
make different inferences about literal, ironic, and opposite speakers.  Of particular 
note is that compared to ironic speakers, participants found opposite speakers to be 
weirder and more confusing.  Knowing that a speaker is saying the opposite of what 
they mean for a reason (i.e., when the speaker is being ironic) shapes how the 
comprehender views that speaker.  Participants used this knowledge as the contextual 
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basis for the ironic speaker’s utterance, but did not do so for the opposite speakers.  
This indicates that comprehenders do consider speaker goals when processing irony. 
The results described thus far indicate that comprehenders can use frequency 
information relatively early to aid in irony processing, but that there is still an overall 
delay for irony.  This suggests that comprehenders might be experiencing some 
competition between the two possible interpretations: literal and ironic.  If this is the 
case, we might expect that there would be some measurable conflict between these 
two opposing interpretations.  Experiment 3 more directly tests the source of the 
delays for irony comprehension observed in Experiment 1 by using a paradigm that 
can detect conflict.  Specifically, this experiment tests whether conflict in irony 






Chapter 4: Experiment 3 
 
Overview 
In Experiment 1, overall looks to the Target were higher for literal utterances 
compared to ironic ones.  Even though irony frequency facilitated ironic criticisms 
compared to compliments, there was still an overall delay for irony, regardless of 
frequency.  The present experiment more directly tests the source of the delays for 
irony comprehension observed in Experiment 1.  Specifically, this experiment tests 
whether comprehending ironic utterances leads to conflict between competing 
representations (literal and ironic). 
In syntactic processing, the simultaneous activation of two interpretations 
leads to conflict that consequently engages cognitive control (Hsu & Novick, 2016; 
Kan et al., 2013).  Cognitive control supports the processing of multiple, competing 
representations (Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001).  Prior studies 
have shown that cognitive control plays a role in a range of linguistic tasks, including 
processing syntactic ambiguities (January, Trueswell, & Thompson-Schill, 2009; Kan 
et al., 2013), picture naming tasks with high competition items (Novick, Kan, 
Trueswell, & Thompson-Schill, 2009), and verb generation and stem completion 
tasks (Botvinick et al., 2001).   
For example, January et al. (2009) used fMRI to show within-subject overlap 
in the brain regions associated with both syntactic and non-syntactic conflict.  That is, 
the regions activated when reading ambiguous sentences were also activated when 
participants performed a Stroop task.  Novick et al. (2009) followed up on these 
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findings by specifically looking at a patient with damage to the left inferior frontal 
gyrus (LIFG).  This region has been shown to be involved in conflict resolution 
across a variety of tasks (e.g., Milham, Banich, Claus, & Cohen, 2003; Thompson-
Schill, D’Esposito, Aguirre, & Farah, 1997; Kan & Thompson-Schill, 2004).  Novick 
et al. (2009) found that this patient demonstrated difficulty in a high-conflict verbal 
fluency task as well as when comprehending temporarily ambiguous sentences.  
Together, these and other studies indicate that cognitive control plays a role in a range 
of linguistic tasks.  While cognitive control plays a role in conflict processing at the 
lexical and syntactic levels (Botvinick et al., 2001; Hsu & Novick, 2016; January et 
al., 2009; Kan et al., 2013; Novick et al., 2009), there is no existing evidence as to 
whether it may also play a role at the level of pragmatics or semantics. 
In this experiment, participants performed two tasks using the conflict 
adaptation paradigm.  One task was the Stroop task, a task that engages cognitive 
control.  The other task was the visual world eye-tracking task used in Experiment 1.  
Participants’ performance on the Stroop task was analyzed as a function of the 
preceding visual world sentence trial.  If irony processing generates conflict between 
the literal and ironic interpretations, then interpreting ironic utterances should engage 
cognitive control and facilitate subsequent performance on a subsequent high-conflict 
(incongruent) Stroop trial.  This would be similar to syntactic ambiguity resolution, 
where conflict arises due to the simultaneous activation of the possible interpretations 
(Hsu & Novick, 2016; Kan et al., 2013).  In contrast, if processing irony does not 
induce conflict, then participants should perform equally well on incongruent Stroop 





Forty-two undergraduates from the University of Maryland participated in this 
experiment for either pay ($5) or course credit.  Of those, ten participants were 
removed from analysis for getting more than 20% of sentence trials incorrect (N = 5), 
not inputting a response for more than 20% of Stroop trials (N = 4), or for having 
participated in a prior irony comprehension experiment (N = 1).  Thus, there were a 
total of 32 participants included in the analyses (18 female, mean age = 19.42, range 
= 18-24).  
Materials and procedure 
As in Experiment 1, participants were seated in front of a computer and their 
eye movements were recorded.  At the beginning of the experiment, participants were 
told that they would complete two tasks: a sentence task and a Stroop task.  
Participants performed 192 trials of two interleaved tasks: a Stroop task (n = 96) and 
the visual world eye-tracking task with literal and ironic utterances used in 
Experiment 1 (n = 96).  Before beginning the experiment, participants completed 
three practice sentence trials (two literal, one ironic) and 144 practice Stroop trials. 
In the Stroop task, participants used a three-button mouse to indicate the ink 
color in which color names were printed on the computer screen.  The response set 
consisted of three colors: blue, yellow, and green.  Half of the trials were congruent (n 
= 48) and half were incongruent (n = 48).  On congruent trials, the color names 
matched the ink color (“blue” in blue ink, “yellow” in yellow ink, and “green” in 
green ink).  On incongruent trials, the color names mismatched the ink color.  Only 
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response-ineligible color names were used on incongruent trials, so that the color 
names did not match any of the colors in the response set (“orange,” “brown,” and 
“red” in blue, yellow, or green ink).  Using only response-ineligible color names on 
incongruent trials means that these trials elicit conflict primarily at the 
representational level rather than the response level (Milham et al., 2001).  Thus, the 
conflict elicited by the Stroop task exists on the same level as the conflict elicited by 
the sentence processing task, where only representational conflict (i.e., between the 
ironic and literal interpretations) should be elicited. 
On the sentence trials, participants were given the same instructions as those 
used in Experiment 1.  Again, their task was to select the character that the speaker 
described (Target character).  To test for cross-task conflict adaptation—namely, 
whether irony comprehension engages cognitive control procedures that facilitate 
listeners’ subsequent ability to resolve conflict—the Stroop trials were pseudo-
randomly interleaved with the language-comprehension trials.  The experiment 
employed a 2 x 2 x 2 design, with current Stroop congruency (congruent, 
incongruent) and previous sentence interpretation type (literal, ironic) as within-
subjects factors, and speaker gender (ironic male and literal female; ironic female and 
literal male) as a between-subjects factor.  Each participant saw 12 instances each of 
four critical conditions: literal language comprehension trials with congruent Stroop 
trials (literal-congruent pairings), literal language comprehension trials with 
incongruent Stroop trials (literal-incongruent pairings), ironic language 
comprehension trials with congruent Stroop trials (ironic-congruent pairings), and 
ironic language comprehension trials with incongruent Stroop trials (ironic-
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incongruent pairings).  In other words, literal or ironic sentences (trial n-1) preceded 
either congruent or incongruent Stroop items (trial n).  Thus, sentence trial type (n-1) 
manipulates the engagement status of cognitive control to observe its immediate 
effects on Stroop trial performance (trial n). 
Two versions of each critical item were created by manipulating the 
interpretation type (ironic or literal).  This generated two presentation lists, such that 
each list contained 24 items in each condition (literal, ironic), and each item appeared 
once in each list.  See Appendix D for a list of all critical items.  Two additional lists 
were generated by manipulating the speaker gender.  For half of the participants, the 
male speaker was ironic and the female speaker was literal.  For the other half, the 
female speaker was ironic and the male speaker was literal.  As in Experiment 1, the 
speakers who pre-recorded the literal and ironic statements were instructed to use an 
enthusiastic tone of voice, which was felicitous with an ironic interpretation, but did 
not preclude a literal one.  Therefore, all participants heard the same recordings. 
A total of 48 filler visual world trials and 48 filler Stroop trials were included 
to ensure that on any given trial, participants could not predict the identity of the 
upcoming task.  That is, Stroop trials were preceded by other Stroop trials (n = 43) 
and visual world trials (n = 53) an approximately equal number of times.  Similarly, 
visual world trials were preceded by Stroop trials (n = 53) and other visual world 
trials (n = 42) an approximately equal number of times.  The filler visual world trials 
contained a negative adjective instead of a positive one, so that participants could not 
predict the adjective valence.  
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Each trial (Stroop and sentence) began with a 500ms fixation, which was then 
replaced with either a Stroop or sentence stimulus.  Both trial types were followed by 
a 1,000ms inter-trial interval.  On Stroop trials, the word remained on the screen until 
the participant made a response or 1,000ms had passed, whichever occurred first.  On 
sentence trials, the character images remained on the screen until the participant made 
a response.  Participants were only able to make a response after the critical utterance 
was completed (the average utterance length was 2,671.9ms).  The timing used in this 
experiment was the same as the timing used by Hsu and Novick (2016) and Kan et al. 
(2013).  We know that cognitive control effects operate across linguistic and non-
linguistic tasks within this time frame, so any null findings cannot be explained by 
timing alone. 
Analysis 
All data were analyzed in R (version 3.3.2; R Core Team, 2016).  For Stroop 
reaction times, a linear mixed effects model was constructed using the lme4 package 
(version 1.1-12; Bates et al., 2015).  The lmerTest package was used to compute p-
values using Satterthwaite’s approximation for denominator degrees of freedom 
(version 2.0-32; Kuznetsova et al., 2015).  The model included prior sentence type 
(ironic, literal), current Stroop type (congruent, incongruent), and their interaction as 
fixed effects.  Current Stroop type and prior sentence type were both deviation coded.  
For all analyses, I first fit maximal models that included both random slopes and 
intercepts for subjects (Barr et al., 2013).  However, when the maximal models did 
not converge, I used simpler models that only included subject as random intercept.  
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Prior to analysis, all trials with reaction times greater than 2 SD from the 
overall mean were removed; this comprised 1.7% of the Stroop trials.  In addition, all 
incorrect trials were removed from analysis; this corresponded to 6.05% of critical 
trials.  Because the reaction times were not normally distributed, they were log-
transformed prior to analysis.  
Accuracy on the Stroop task was analyzed with a mixed effects logistic 
regression model using the lme4 package (version 1.1-12; Bates et al., 2015) and the 
lmerTest package to compute p-values (version 2.0-32; Kuznetsova et al., 2015).  
Again, participant was included as a random intercept and prior sentence type and 
current Stroop type, as well as their interaction, were included as fixed effects.  
Current Stroop type and prior sentence type were both deviation coded. 
The visual-world eye-tracking data were pre-processed in the same way as in 
Experiment 1.  Eye movements were divided into three time regions of interest: pre-
adjective (“What a”), adjective-noun (“fabulous chef”), and pronoun (“he is”).  For 
each region, looks prior to 200ms were removed to account for the time it takes to 
launch a saccade (Allopenna et al., 1998; Matin et al., 1993).  In addition, all 
incorrect trials (i.e., where the participant did not click on the Target) were removed 
from analysis (4.13% of trials).  The two characters were coded as Target (who the 
speaker described) and Distractor (the other character on the screen).  The primary 
dependent measure consisted of the proportion of looks to the Target, calculated as 
Target looks divided by Target plus Distractor looks.  The proportion of looks to the 
Target was averaged across 50ms windows.   
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Target looks were analyzed in R (version 3.3.2; R Core Team, 2016).  For 




All model parameters for reaction time are included in Table 16Error! 
Reference source not found..  As shown in Figure 10, there was a significant main 
effect of Stroop trial type: participants were faster on congruent trials (M = 673.3 ms, 
SE = 81.6) compared to incongruent trials (M = 704.1 ms, SE = 68.9), F(1, 93) = 
26.59, p < .0001.  (Note: analyses were performed on log-transformed data, but raw 
RTs are reported here for clarity of interpretation.)  More importantly, there was a 
significant interaction between current Stroop type and previous sentence type: 
participants were faster on incongruent Stroop trials preceded by ironic utterances (M 
= 695.2 ms, SE = 68.7) compared to incongruent Stroop trials preceded by literal 
utterances (M = 713.0 ms, SE = 69.1), F(1, 93) = 5.29, p < .05.  Thus, the standard 
Stroop effect is smaller when Stroop trials follow ironic utterances (Figure 9 left bars, 
p = .19) compared to when Stroop trials follow literal ones (right bars, p < .001).  It is 
important to note that the paired comparisons did not indicate a significant difference 
between incongruent trials preceded by a literal utterance (IC) and incongruent trials 
preceded by an ironic utterance (II; p = .26).  However, the pattern of results—the 
reduced conflict effect after an ironic utterance (and faster reaction times on II vs. CI 
trials)—seems to indicate that comprehending an ironic utterance does facilitate 




Model Parameters for Stroop Reaction Time: Exp. 3	
 Parameters 
Factor β  SE  t  p 
Intercept 6.51  0.02  349.74  < .0001 
Current Trial -0.05  0.01  -5.16  < .0001 
Previous Trial 0.00  0.01  0.32  .75 
Current Trial x Previous Trial -0.04  0.02  -2.30  .02 




Figure 10. Reaction time by current Stroop trial type (congruent, incongruent) and 
prior sentence type (literal, ironic).  Note: while log-transformed data were used for 
analysis, raw reaction times are shown here and in text for illustration purposes.  Bars 
represent standard errors. 
 
 
All model parameters for accuracy are included in Table 17.  There was no 
main effect of current trial type (p = .90), nor was there an interaction between 


























effect of prior sentence type, F(1, 1359) = 2.09, p < .05.  On average, participants 
were more accurate on Stroop trials preceded by a literal sentence trial (M = 95.3%, 
SE = 3.7) compared to an ironic trial (M = 92.6%, SE = 4.6). 
Table 17 
Model Parameters for Stroop Accuracy: Exp. 3	
 Parameters 
Factor Β  SE  z  p 
Intercept 2.77  0.12  23.80  < .0001 
Current Trial 0.03  0.23  0.13  .90 
Previous Trial 0.49  0.23  2.09  .04 
Current Trial x Previous Trial 0.29  0.47  0.62  .53 
Note. Model specification: Accuracy ~ Current Trial * Previous Trial + (1|Subject) 
 
 
Figure 11. Accuracy by current Stroop trial type (congruent, incongruent) and prior 
sentence type (ironic, literal).  Bars represent standard errors. 
Sentence task 
There was no significant difference between Target looks for literal and ironic 





















However, looks to the Target during the adjective-noun region were significantly 
greater for literal utterances (M = 0.62, SE = 0.09) than for ironic utterances (M = 
0.58, SE = 0.09), t(31) = -3.49, p < .01.  This is consistent with the findings from 
Experiment 1.  In addition, participants were significantly more accurate on literal 
trials (M = 96.9%, SE = 3.0) compared to ironic trials (M = 94.3%, SE = 4.1), t(31) = 
-3.10, p < .01. 
Discussion 
The results from Experiment 1 indicated that looks to the Target were lower 
for ironic utterances compared to literal ones.  The goal of Experiment 3 was to test 
the source of this difference.  In particular, this experiment tested whether irony 
induces conflict and therefore engages cognitive control.  To do so, participant 
performance on a Stroop task was examined as function of the prior sentence type.  If 
comprehending irony generates competition between two potential interpretations 
(literal and ironic), then performance on incongruent Stroop trials should be 
facilitated by preceding ironic utterances (but not literal ones).  This would be similar 
to syntactic ambiguity resolution, where conflict arises due to the simultaneous 
activation of the possible interpretations (Hsu & Novick, 2016; Kan et al., 2013). 
The present findings corroborate those from Experiment 1: during the 
adjective-noun region, looks to the Target were greater for literal utterances than for 
ironic ones.  More importantly, the results indicate that participants were faster on 
incongruent Stroop trials that were preceded by ironic utterances compared to literal 
ones.  Thus, ironic utterances generated conflict that was resolved by cognitive 
control.  The engagement of cognitive control then facilitated performance on a 
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subsequent high-conflict Stroop trial.  These results suggest that, like syntactic 
ambiguity, ironic utterances leads to the activation of competing representations that 
must be resolved. 
These findings also seem to corroborate work on irony processing using 
event-related brain potentials (ERPs).  For example, Filik, Leuthold, Wallington, & 
Page (2014) had participants read familiar and unfamiliar ironic utterances while 
measuring their ERPs.  Familiarity was determined using a pre-test, where 
participants rated how familiar they were with the ironic utterances (importantly, they 
did not distinguish between criticisms and compliments).  Filik et al. found that both 
familiar and unfamiliar ironies elicited a P600-like effect.  They argue that this 
positivity reflects ongoing conflict between the literal and ironic interpretations.  This 
indicates not only that ironic utterances generated conflict, but also that the conflict 
was sustained long after the disambiguating word.  Thus, it is not surprising that in 
the present experiment, the conflict elicited by interpreting an ironic utterance 
improved performance on a subsequent cognitive control task. 
Work on syntactic ambiguity resolution has demonstrated both adaptation 
from Stroop trials to sentence trials (Hsu & Novick, 2016) and from sentence trials to 
Stroop trials (Kan et al., 2013).  One might expect that irony might behave similarly.  
Specifically, while this experiment shows adaptation from ironic utterances to Stroop 
trials, we might also observe conflict adaptation from Stroop trials to sentence trials.  





Chapter 5: Experiment 4 
Overview 
Experiment 3 provided evidence that comprehending irony facilitates the 
subsequent resolution of conflict on a Stroop task.  That is, the Stroop effect was 
mitigated when the participant had just heard an ironic utterance compared to a literal 
one.  While Experiment 3 focused on how the interpretation of irony affects cognitive 
control, Experiment 4 looks at how cognitive control engagement affects the process 
of interpreting irony.  That is, Experiment 4 asks whether the engagement of 
cognitive control facilitates the subsequent processing of ironic utterances.  This 
would be similar to work by Hsu and Novick (2016) showing that resolving Stroop 
conflict facilitates the subsequent processing of temporarily ambiguous utterances. 
Hsu and Novick (2016) had participants complete interleaved Stroop trials and 
sentence trials.  On sentence trials, participants viewed a scene and carried out verbal 
instructions while their eye movements were recorded. Participants either heard 
temporarily ambiguous instructions (as in 1 below) or unambiguous instructions (as 
in 2 below). 
(1) Put the frog on the napkin onto the box. 
(2) Put the frog that’s on the napkin onto the box. 
The visual scenes contained four objects.  For example, the scene might contain a 
frog on a napkin (target), a box (correct goal), an empty napkin (incorrect goal) box, 
and a horse (competitor).  Hsu and Novick found that when an ambiguous sentence 
trial followed an incongruent Stroop trial, participants made fewer action errors than 
if the prior trial had been congruent.  In addition, the proportion of looks to the 
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correct goal (the box) were greater on ambiguous trials preceded by an incongruent 
Stroop trial compared to a congruent one.  Thus, comprehenders resolved the conflict 
in the ambiguous sentence trials more quickly and accurately when cognitive control 
was already engaged by the preceding high-conflict Stroop trial.  
In this experiment, Stroop trials and visual world eye-tracking trials were 
interleaved as in Experiment 3 (and Hsu & Novick, 2016).  However, rather than 
looking at performance on Stroop trials, the present experiment looked at eye 
movement patterns as a function of the prior Stroop trial type.  If interpreting irony is 
like resolving temporary syntactic ambiguity, then ironic utterances should be 




Forty-five undergraduates from the University of Maryland participated in this 
experiment for either pay ($5) or course credit.  Of those, thirteen participants were 
removed from analysis for getting more than 80% of sentence trials incorrect (N = 7), 
getting more than 80% of Stroop trials incorrect (N = 3), not inputting responses for 
more than 20% of Stroop trials (N = 2), or for more than 20% eye-tracking track loss 
(N = 1).  Thus, a total of 32 participants were included in the analyses (25 female, 
mean age = 19.87, range = 18-29).  
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Materials and procedure 
Participants performed 192 trials of two interleaved tasks: the Stroop task 
used in Experiment 3 (n = 96) and the visual world eye-tracking task with literal and 
ironic utterances used in Experiments 1 and 3 (n = 96).  As in Experiment 3, 
participants completed three practice sentence trials (two literal, one ironic) and 144 
practice Stroop trials before beginning the experiment. 
On the sentence trials, participants were given the same instructions as those 
used in Experiment 3.  Again, their task was to select the character that the speaker 
described (Target character).  To test for cross-task conflict adaptation—namely, 
whether the engagement of cognitive control facilitates listeners’ irony 
comprehension—the Stroop trials were pseudo-randomly interleaved with the 
language-comprehension trials.  The experiment employed a 2 x 2 x 2 design, with 
current sentence interpretation type (literal, ironic) and Stroop congruency 
(congruent, incongruent) as within-subjects factors, and speaker gender (ironic male 
and literal female; ironic female and literal male) as a between-subjects factor.  Each 
participant saw 12 instances each of four critical conditions: congruent Stroop trials 
with literal language comprehension trials (congruent-literal pairings), incongruent 
Stroop trials with literal language comprehension trials (incongruent-literal pairings), 
congruent Stroop trials with ironic language comprehension trials (congruent-ironic 
pairings), and incongruent Stroop trials with ironic language comprehension trials 
(incongruent-ironic pairings).  In other words, congruent or incongruent Stroop items 
(trial n-1) preceded either literal or ironic sentence items (trial n).  Thus, Stroop trial 
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type (n-1) affects the engagement status of cognitive control to observe its immediate 
effects on sentence trial performance (trial n). 
Again, two versions of each critical item were created by manipulating the 
interpretation type (ironic or literal).  This generated two presentation lists, such that 
each list contained 24 items in each condition (literal, ironic), and each item appeared 
once in each list.  Two additional lists were generated by manipulating the speaker 
gender.  For half of the participants, the male speaker was ironic and the female 
speaker was literal.  For the other half, the female speaker was ironic and the male 
speaker was literal.  As in Experiments 1 and 3, the speakers who pre-recorded the 
literal and ironic statements were instructed to use an enthusiastic tone of voice, 
which was felicitous with an ironic interpretation, but did not preclude a literal one.  
Therefore, all participants heard the same recordings. 
A total of 48 filler visual world trials and 48 filler Stroop trials were included 
to ensure that on any given trial, participants could not predict the identity of the 
upcoming task.  That is, in total, Stroop trials were preceded by other Stroop trials (n 
= 37) and visual world trials (n = 58) an approximately equal number of times.  
Similarly, visual world trials were preceded by Stroop trials (n = 58) and other visual 
world trials (n = 38) an approximately equal number of times.  The filler visual world 
trials contained a negative adjective instead of a positive one, so that participants 
could not predict the adjective valence.  
The timing was the same as Experiment 3.  Each trial began with a 500ms 
fixation and each trial was followed by a 1,000ms inter-trial-interval.  This is the 
same timing that was used by Hsu and Novick (2016) and Kan et al. (2013).  It is 
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important to note that the time between the end of a Stroop trial and the start of a 
subsequent sentence trial was shorter than the time between the end of a sentence trial 
and the start of a subsequent Stroop trial.  This is because the average utterance length 
(2,671.9ms) is longer than the maximum amount of time allowed for a Stroop 
response (1,000ms).  As a result, if adaptation from Stroop to sentence trials is not 
observed, it cannot be attributable to a longer time from Stroop to sentence trials. 
Analysis 
All data were analyzed in R (version 3.3.2; R Core Team, 2016).  For the 
visual-world eye-tracking task, analysis proceeded in the same way as in Experiment 
1.  For each region, looks prior to 200ms were removed to account for the time it 
takes to launch a saccade (Allopenna et al., 1998; Matin et al., 1993).  In addition, all 
incorrect trials (i.e., where the subject did not click on the Target) were removed from 
analysis; this corresponded to 3.42% of all trials.  I coded the two characters as Target 
(who the speaker described) and Distractor (the other character on the screen).  The 
primary dependent measure examined the proportion of looks to the Target, which 
was calculated as Target looks divided by Target plus Distractor looks.  The 
proportion of looks to the Target was averaged across 50ms windows.   
For each region, a linear mixed effects model was constructed using the lme4 
package (version 1.1-12; Bates et al., 2015).  The lmerTest package was used to 
compute p-values using Satterthwaite’s approximation for denominator degrees of 
freedom (version 2.0-32; Kuznetsova et al., 2015).  Each model included current 
sentence type (literal, ironic), previous Stroop type (congruent, incongruent), and time 
from adjective onset (in 50ms bins) as fixed effects.  Current and previous trial type 
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were both deviation coded, while time bin was included as a continuous factor.  For 
the adjective-noun region, an additional model was constructed that only included 
previous Stroop type (congruent, incongruent) and current sentence type (literal, 
ironic) to better understand the overall, time-independent effects.  For all sentence 
trial analyses, I first fit maximal models that included both random slopes and 
intercepts for subjects and trials (Barr et al., 2013).  However, when the maximal 
models did not converge, I used simpler models that only included subject and trial as 
random intercepts.  
As will be described below, the present experiment did not find conflict 
adaptation effects from the Stroop task to the sentence task.  In order to ensure that 
this experiment did not differ drastically from Experiment 3, I additionally analyzed 
the Stroop data in the same way as in Experiment 3.  It is important to note that this 
experiment was not designed to test performance on Stroop trials as a function of the 
prior sentence type.  The number of trials per condition was not equal; there were 21 
literal to congruent trials, 27 literal to incongruent trials, 30 ironic to congruent trials, 
and 18 ironic to incongruent trials.  However, these analyses could help shed light on 
why there was no conflict adaptation effect on sentence trials, as would have been 
expected. 
For the Stroop reaction times, a linear mixed effects model was constructed 
using the lme4 package (version 1.1-12; Bates et al., 2015).  The lmerTest package 
was used to compute p-values using Satterthwaite’s approximation for denominator 
degrees of freedom (version 2.0-32; Kuznetsova et al., 2015).  The model included 
prior sentence type (ironic, literal), current Stroop type (congruent, incongruent), and 
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their interaction as fixed effects.  Current Stroop type and prior sentence type were 
both deviation coded.  As above, I first fit maximal models that included both random 
slopes and intercepts for subjects (Barr et al., 2013).  However, when the maximal 
models did not converge, I used simpler models that only included subject as random 
intercept.  Prior to analysis, all trials with reaction times greater than 2 SD from the 
overall mean were removed; this comprised 4.0% of the Stroop trials.  In addition, 
because the reaction times were not normally distributed, they were log-transformed 
prior to analysis.   
Results 
Sentence task 
Figure 12 plots the average looks to the Target, collapsing across time, during 
each region of interest by condition (magnitude analyses).  Figure 13 plots the 
average looks to the Target during each region of interest by condition and time (rate 
analyses).  As Figure 12 shows, the mean proportion of looks to the Target during the 
pre-adjective region was 0.50 (SE = 0.08).  The linear model parameters for the pre-
adjective region are shown in Table 18.  Unexpectedly, there were two significant 
interactions during this region.  First, there was a significant interaction between 
previous trial and time, F(1, 9,947.5) = 3.99, p < .05.  This appears to be driven by 
the fact that looks to the Target increased more quickly when the previous Stroop trial 
was congruent versus incongruent.  There was additionally a significant three-way 
interaction between current trial, previous trial, and time, F(1, 9,945.3) = 8.77, p < 
.01.  Importantly, as Figure 13 shows, these pre-adjective effects are primarily in the 
CC condition (literal sentence-congruent Stroop), which is not critical to identifying 
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conflict adaptation.  Rather, conflict adaptation effects would be seen in the II (vs. CI) 
condition, which does not exhibit these early effects. 
 
 
Figure 12. Mean proportion of looks to Target character in by region (pre-adjective, 
adjective-noun, pronoun) and condition (congruent-congruent [CC], congruent-
incongruent [CI], incongruent-congruent [IC], incongruent-incongruent [II]).  Bars 



































Figure 13. Average proportion of looks to the Target character in 50-ms intervals 
post-adjective onset by region (pre-adjective, adjective-noun, pronoun) and condition 
(congruent-congruent [CC], congruent-incongruent [CI], incongruent-congruent [IC], 
incongruent-incongruent [II]).  The first vertical line represents the adjective onset 
and the second vertical line represents the average onset time of the pronoun.  Bars 
represent standard errors. 
 
Table 18 
Model Parameters for Pre-Adjective Region: Exp. 4 
 Parameters 
Factor β  SE  t  p 
Intercept 0.51  0.02  20.44  < .0001 
Current Trial 0.02  0.05  0.45  0.65 
Previous Trial 0.05  0.05  0.92  0.36 
Time -0.00  0.00  -0.86  0.39 
Current Trial x Previous Trial 0.03  0.10  0.29  0.77 
Current Trial x Time 0.00  0.00  0.59  0.55 
Previous Trial x Time 0.01  0.00  2.00  0.05 
Current Trial x Previous Trial x 
Time 
0.03  0.01  2.97  < .01 
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As described above, two linear mixed effects models were constructed for the 
adjective-noun region.  The parameters for the magnitude model including only 
current and previous trial type are shown in Table 20.  As Figure 12 and Table 19 
indicate, the proportion of looks to the Target was significantly higher for literal trials 
(M = 0.56, SE = 0.09) than ironic trials (M = 0.53, SE = 0.09).  This was confirmed by 
a significant main effect of current trial type, F(1, 48.07) = 4.64, p < .05.  This is in 
line with the results from Experiments 1 and 3, where the proportion of Target looks 
on literal trials was greater than Target looks on ironic trials.  However, there was no 
main effect of previous Stroop trial type (p = .16), nor an interaction between current 
and previous trial type (p = .22).  
Table 19 
Model Parameters for Adjective-Noun Region without Time: Exp. 4 
 Parameters 
Factor β  SE  t  p 
Intercept 0.54  0.01  67.64  < .0001 
Current Trial 0.03  0.01  2.15  < .05 
Previous Trial 0.02  0.01  1.42  .16 
Current Trial x Previous Trial 0.04  0.3  1.25  .22 
Note. Model specification: TargetLooks ~ Current Trial * Previous Trial + (1|Subject) 
+ (1|Item) 
 
Figure 13 plots the average looks to the Target over time during each region 
of interest (pre-adjective, adjective-noun, and pronoun) by current sentence type 
(literal, ironic) and previous Stroop type (congruent, incongruent; rate analyses).  The 
parameters for the rate model including current trial, previous trial, and time are 
shown in Table 20.  As Table 20 and Figure 13 show, there was a main effect of time: 
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the proportion of looks to the Target increased over time across all conditions, F(1, 
36,580) = 180.34, p < .0001.  In addition, the results indicate that there was a 
significant interaction between current sentence trial and time, F(1, 36,580) = 124.85, 
p < .0001.  Looks to the Target in the literal condition increased more quickly than in 
the ironic condition.  Again, this is in line with the findings from Experiment 1.  
Similarly, there was a significant interaction between previous Stroop trial and time, 
F(1, 36,575) = 9.61, p < .01.  Target looks increased more quickly when the previous 
trial was congruent compared to incongruent.  Finally, there was a significant three-
way interaction between current trial, previous trial, and time, F(1, 36,569) = 27.36, p 
< .0001.  Importantly, this three-way interaction does not seem to reflect conflict 
adaptation.  If adaptation were present, we would expect looks to the Target in the II 
condition (incongruent Stroop-ironic sentence) to increase more quickly than looks to 
the Target in the CI condition (congruent Stroop-incongruent sentence).  Figure 13 
suggests that this is not the source of the interaction: the dotted orange line (II) does 
not increase more quickly than the dotted blue line (CI).  Thus, contrary to 
expectations, comprehending irony is not facilitated by the prior engagement of 
cognitive control. 
Table 20  
Model Parameters for Adjective-Noun Region with Time: Exp. 4 
 Parameters 
Factor β  SE  t  p 
Intercept 0.49  0.01  44.23  < .0001 
Current Trial -0.06  0.02  -3.73  < .001 
Previous Trial 0.00  0.02  -0.30  0.77 
Time 0.00  0.00  13.43  < .0001 
Current Trial x Previous Trial 0.13  0.03  3.86  < .001 
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Current Trial x Time 0.01  0.00  11.17  < .0001 
Previous Trial x Time 0.00  0.00  3.10  < .001 
Current Trial x Previous Trial x 
Time 
-0.01  0.00  -5.23  < .0001 
Note. Model specification: TargetLooks ~ Current Trial * Previous Trial * Time + 
(1|Subject) + (1|Item) 
 
By the pronoun region, participants had largely converged on the Target 
across conditions: the proportion of looks to the Target was equal to or greater than 
80% in all conditions.  The complete modeling results are shown in Table 21.  By this 
region, there was no longer a three-way interaction between current trial, previous 
trial, and time (p = .10). 
Table 21 
Model Parameters for Pronoun Region: Exp. 4 
 Parameters 
Factor β  SE  t  p 
Intercept 0.47  0.02  24.16  < .0001 
Current Trial 0.21  0.03  7.92  < .0001 
Previous Trial 0.02  0.03  0.68  0.50 
Time 0.01  0.00  30.10  < .0001 
Current Trial x Previous Trial -0.08  0.05  -1.52  0.13 
Current Trial x Time -0.01  0.00  -8.77  < .0001 
Previous Trial x Time -0.00  0.00  -1.00  0.32 
Current Trial x Previous Trial x 
Time 
-0.00  0.00  1.66  0.10 
Note. Model specification: TargetLooks ~ Current Trial * Previous Trial * Time + 
(1|Subject) + (1|Item) 
Stroop task 
Because adaptation from Stroop to sentence trials was not observed, an 
additional analysis of the Stroop trials was performed.  As shown in Figure 14, there 
was a significant main effect of current Stroop type: participants were faster on 
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congruent trials (M = 620.2 ms, SE = 24.5) compared to incongruent trials (M = 639.6 
ms, SE = 24.0), F(1, 93) = 24.86, p < .0001.  (Note: analyses were performed on log-
transformed data, but raw RTs are reported here for clarity of interpretation.)  More 
importantly, there was a significant interaction between current Stroop type and 
previous sentence type: participants were faster on incongruent Stroop trials preceded 
by ironic utterances (M = 670.0, SE = 21.9) compared to incongruent Stroop trials 
preceded by literal utterances (M = 697.0 ms, SE = 23.0), F(1, 93) = 19.15, p < .0001.  
Thus, while there was no conflict adaptation from Stroop trials to sentence trials, 
there was adaptation from sentence trials to Stroop trials.  This lends further support 
to the conclusions from Experiment 3, where conflict adaptation from sentence to 




Figure 14. Reaction time by current Stroop trial type (congruent, incongruent) and 
prior sentence type (literal, ironic).  Note: while log-transformed data were used for 
analysis, raw reaction times are shown here and in text for illustration purposes.  Bars 
represent standard errors. 
Discussion 
The goal of Experiment 4 was to determine how cognitive control engagement 
affects the process of interpreting irony.  In particular, this experiment addressed 
whether conflict adaptation occurs from Stroop trials to ironic sentence trials.  Indeed, 
work on syntactic ambiguity has shown adaptation both from temporarily ambiguous 
sentence to Stroop trials (Kan et al., 2013) and from Stroop to sentence trials (Hsu & 
Novick, 2016).  Experiment 3 demonstrated conflict adaptation from ironic sentence 
trials to Stroop trials.  However, contrary to expectations, adaptation was not 
observed from Stroop trials to sentence trials in this experiment. 
Of course, caution should be used when interpreting a null result.  However, 
there are a number of possible explanations for why adaptation was not observed in 


























conflict.  This is somewhat unlikely, given that adaptation was observed (in both 
Experiments 3 and 4) from sentence trials to Stroop trials.  In addition, the timing 
used in this experiment was the same as that used by Hsu and Novick (2016), so it is 
also unlikely that the lack of adaptation is due to differences in timing.  A second 
possibility has to do with how the setup of Experiment 4 differs from that used by 
Hsu and Novick (2016).  In Hsu and Novick’s study, participants used the mouse to 
act out the movement of objects on the screen.  While Hsu and Novick’s displays 
contained four objects (target, correct goal, incorrect goal, distractor), the present 
experiment only contained two possible referents: Fred and Sally.  It is possible that 
the two-alternative forced choice design used here leads to different looking patterns 
that are not affected by prior cognitive control engagement in the same way.  Another 
possible explanation is that the increased memory demands in this experiment could 
have limited or masked the role of cognitive control engagement on the sentence 
trials.  While the participants in this experiment were incorrect 3.42% of the time on 
sentence trials, the rate was only 1.93% in Experiment 1.  Furthermore, many more 
participants had to be dropped for excessively low accuracy rates in Experiment 4 (n 
= 7) than Experiment 1 (n = 2).  These lower accuracy rates probably arise from the 
fact that participants had to remember the Stroop task buttons as well as the speaker 
identities.  If participants were not accessing the speaker identities quickly (due to 
increased memory demands), then the engagement of cognitive control may not have 
had an effect on their interpretations.  Figure 13 seems to corroborate this possibility, 
as Target looks early on (prior to 750ms) were particularly noisy. 
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In addition, a final possibility is that the lack of adaptation observed in this 
experiment could be due to theoretical, rather than methodological, causes.  For 
example, it is possible that irony is processed sequentially, rather than 
simultaneously.  That is, the listener might first activate the literal interpretation and 
then the ironic one (indeed, the overall delay for irony in Experiment 1 lends support 
to this idea).  In this case, conflict would likely arise later during the ironic utterance, 
after the literal interpretation was already accessed.  It is therefore possible that the 
resulting engagement of cognitive control would carry over to the subsequent Stroop 
trial (as in Experiment 3), but that adaptation would not occur in the opposite 
direction.  That is, the time from the end of the sentence to the next Stroop trial could 
be shorter (approximately 1,500ms) than the time from the end of the Stroop trial to 
late in the next sentence (approximately 4,000ms).  This would result in adaptation 
from sentence to Stroop, but not from Stroop to sentence.  In addition, the particular 
task demands could play an important role as well.  For the Stroop task, the goal is to 
inhibit one representation (the word itself) in favor of another (the color of the word 
ink).  In contrast, some researchers have suggested that successfully comprehending 
irony requires activating and maintaining both interpretations, potentially for 
comparison, which may lead to late or ongoing conflict (Filik et al., 2014; Giora & 
Fein, 2007). 
There are a number of ways to test the above possibilities.  First, the setup 
could be manipulated such that four characters are presented instead of two.  This 
would align more closely with the setup used by Hsu and Novick (2016).  In addition, 
participants could complete more practices trials to ensure they accurately 
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remembered the Stroop buttons as well as the speaker identities.  In this experiment, 
participants only completed three practice sentence trials (as they did in Experiment 
1) and 18 practice Stroop trials.  This is quite different from Hsu and Novick’s study, 
where participants completed 144 practice Stroop trials and four sentence trials (with 
the option for more, if the participant wanted).  Of course, Hsu and Novick did not 
manipulate speaker type, so there was less of a memory load than in this experiment.  
Perhaps with practice participant performance would reduce any memory-induced 
difficulty.  Thus, more work needs to be done to better understand the role of conflict 






Chapter 6:  General Discussion 
Summary of findings 
It is well known that speakers use irony for a broad range of pragmatic 
purposes, such as testing and bolstering common ground (Brown, 1995), saving face 
when making criticisms (Dews & Winner, 1995; Jorgensen, 1996) and increasing 
politeness (Attardo, 2001).  However, how irony is understood in real-time is a topic 
of debate.  The goal of this dissertation was to investigate how context and frequency 
influence irony comprehension by systematically testing (a) when and how 
comprehenders use contextual information during irony processing (Exps. 1 & 2A), 
(b) the inferences listeners make about ironic speakers (Exp. 2B), and (c) whether 
irony induces conflict between incompatible representations (i.e., literal and ironic) of 
utterance meaning (Exps. 3 & 4).  In Experiment 1, I showed that there was no effect 
of frequency on the overall proportion of Target looks during the region of interest.  
Target looks were greater for literal utterances than ironic ones, regardless of 
frequency.  This suggests that the interpretation of ironic utterances is delayed overall 
compared to literal ones.  However, the speed with which comprehenders reached 
ironic interpretations was modulated by frequency: participants were faster to 
interpret more frequent ironic criticisms than less frequent ironic compliments.  In 
Experiment 2A, I showed that the way in which comprehenders understand irony 
differs from how they understand opposites.  In particular, the frequency of 
interpretation (criticisms vs. compliments) did not influence processing speed or 
overall interpretations for opposites.  Thus, processing irony involves more than 
simply computing the opposite of the utterance, instead requiring listeners to draw the 
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pragmatic inferences made about the speaker’s intentions.  Similarly, the data from 
Experiment 2B indicate that comprehenders view the social-pragmatic goals of ironic 
speakers differently from opposite speakers.  This is further evidence that 
understanding irony involves drawing conclusions about speakers and their goals in a 
way that understanding (or computing) opposites does not.  In Experiments 3 and 4 I 
tested whether and how comprehending irony induces representational conflict.  
Experiment 3 showed that comprehenders experience conflict between the literal and 
ironic interpretations when interpreting irony, corroborating the findings from 
Experiment 1.  Hearing an ironic utterance engaged cognitive control, which then 
facilitated performance on a subsequent high-conflict Stroop trial. This is consistent 
with work on syntactic ambiguity resolution, where interpreting a temporarily 
ambiguous sentence facilitates performance on a subsequent high-conflict task (Kan 
et al., 2013).  Thus, cognitive control is engaged to adjudicate between the 
incompatible interpretations (literal and ironic), providing further evidence that 
listeners do not immediately access irony without somehow consulting the literal 
meaning.  In Experiment 4, however, conflict adaptation was not observed from 
Stroop trials to sentence trials, in contrast to prior work on syntactic ambiguity 
resolution (Hsu & Novick, 2016; see Chapter 5 for discussion).  
To briefly summarize, the overall findings from this dissertation show that the 
frequency of irony modulates how quickly the listener reaches the ironic 
interpretation: frequent ironic criticisms are faster than infrequent ironic compliments.  
However, even for conventional uses, ironic interpretations appear to compete with 
the literal meaning of the utterance.  Activation, as measured by Target looks, is 
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lower overall for ironic interpretations compared to literal ones.  To resolve this 
competition, the system draws on cognitive control procedures in a way that 
resembles how the system avoids misinterpretation at lower levels (Hsu & Novick, 
2016; Kan et al., 2013).  
In the remainder of this chapter I will examine four topics.  First, I discuss the 
implications this work has for traditional models of irony processing and the kind of 
model that this dissertation suggests.  Next, I talk about the relationship between the 
present findings and prior work on other phenomena at the semantics-pragmatics 
interface.  In the following section, I touch on how this work speaks to topics related 
to the lexicon and social cognition.  I then talk about the implications that the present 
findings have for more general theories of sentence processing and language 
comprehension more broadly. Finally, I discuss limitations to the experiments in this 
dissertation as well as directions for future work. 
Traditional theories of irony processing 
 The present findings can speak to the traditional accounts of irony described 
in Chapter 1.  To briefly review, there are three standard accounts for irony 
comprehension.  According to the standard pragmatic view, comprehending irony 
occurs in stages (Cutler, 1976; Dews & Winner, 1999; Giora et al., 2007).  The 
listener first accesses the literal interpretation of an ironic utterance.  Then, if there is 
a mismatch between the literal interpretation and the context of the speaker’s 
utterance, the listener computes the ironic interpretation.  Thus, context is not used 
until later in processing.  In contrast, the direct access view argues that context 
interacts with lexical processing early on (Gibbs, 1986; Ivanko & Pexman, 2003).  
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Here, if the context is sufficiently supportive, the listener can access the ironic 
interpretation of the utterance without needing to access the literal meaning first.  
Finally, the graded salience hypothesis distinguishes between more and less salient 
ironies, where salience is determined by frequency, familiarity, or conventionality 
(Giora, 1997; Giora et al., 1998).  For salient ironies, the ironic meaning is lexicalized 
and therefore accessed directly.  However, less salient ironies are processed in stages: 
literal meaning first, then ironic. 
The findings in this dissertation do not seem to support any one account 
completely, but the graded salience hypothesis offers a relatively good fit.  While the 
standard pragmatic view predicts irony will be delayed, it does not take irony 
frequency into account.  Similarly, the direct access account would explain why 
ironic criticisms are processed at the same rate as literal utterances (the rate effect in 
Experiment 1).  However, neither of these accounts perfectly explains the data – 
specifically, that irony will be delayed overall, but that the rate of interpretation will 
be modulated by frequency.  In contrast, the graded salience hypothesis considers the 
role of frequency, something that the other accounts do not.  However, there are still 
some gaps.  For example, the overall delay for even the more frequent form of irony 
observed here seems to suggest that irony is not actually lexicalized, as the graded 
salience hypothesis would predict.  If it were, ironic criticisms should be processed as 
quickly as literal utterances.  It is also unclear how frequency maps onto the account’s 
idea of “salience.”  For example, a study conducted to test this account used stimuli 
that were pre-tested for familiarity.  The target phrases were presented to participants 
who rated them on how familiar they were as ironic statements (Filik et al., 2014).  
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However, frequency as defined by the criticisms/compliment distinction was not 
manipulated.  Thus, some of the “familiar” ironies were negative (“What a shame”) 
while others were positive (“You are so tactful”).  Indeed, the lack of a clear 
definition of salience makes this particular theory difficult to falsify.  To better 
evaluate this model’s fit to the data presented here, it would be useful to directly 
manipulate and test the effects of frequency and familiarity.  This would be a 
productive direction for future work. 
A model that accommodates my results might look as follows.  When an 
ironic utterance is produced, the literal interpretation is accessed immediately.  The 
listener then consults the context to determine whether the utterance is appropriate.  
(It is also possible that these processes happen in tandem, I stake no claim here about 
sequential vs. simultaneous access.  However, see the below section on sentence 
processing for a discussion of how the present experiments might speak to this issue.)  
This context may include situational context (the current situation and prior events), 
within-speaker information (whether a speaker has a tendency to be ironic), or across-
speaker information (the greater frequency of ironic criticisms vs. compliments).  
Given that the literal interpretation of the utterance is not appropriate in the context, 
the listener generates the ironic interpretation.  Importantly, as the magnitude effect in 
Experiment 1 shows, there will be an overall delay for irony.  In Experiment 1, 
providing strong context (in the form of speaker identity information) for irony did 
not eliminate delays, even for the more frequent criticisms.  This indicates that unlike 
homophones, irony is not stored in the mental lexicon.  If it were, providing context 
for irony would eliminate the delay (particularly for the more frequent criticisms), 
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similar to how context for equibiased homophones leads to activation for only the 
relevant meaning (Duffy et al., 1998).  Thus, regardless of whether the ironic 
utterance is a criticism or compliment, there will be an overall delay.  However, if the 
utterance is a criticism, it will be processed relatively quickly given the increased 
frequency of prior experience (i.e., the across-speaker context).  Because the cue to 
ironic criticisms is stronger (due to greater frequency across speakers), the increase in 
activation for the ironic interpretation rises at the same rate as the literal interpretation 
(i.e., the rate effect observed in Experiment 1).  If the ironic utterance is a 
compliment, its relatively infrequent use makes it a weaker cue, therefore generating 
an additional processing delay.  Regardless of frequency, the listener must then either 
revise or inhibit their initial literal interpretation using cognitive control.  Thus, the 
(sequential or simultaneous) activation of the two interpretations—literal and ironic—
generates conflict, thereby leading to an overall delay for irony interpretation.   
The semantics-pragmatics interface 
This dissertation addresses the semantics-pragmatics interface and how these 
two levels of representation relate to one another.  The findings discussed here 
suggest that for irony, the activation of the literal and ironic interpretations generates 
conflict.  For ironic compliments, this conflict manifests as delays both in the 
magnitude of Target looks as well as the growth rate of Target looks over time.  For 
ironic criticisms, the conflict only manifests itself in the rate of Target looks, not 
magnitude. 
Similar results have been obtained for other pragmatic phenomena like scalar 
implicatures.  Scalar terms like some have two possible interpretations: a semantic 
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meaning (“some and possibly all”) and a pragmatic meaning (“some but not all”).  
For example, the semantic analysis of utterance (1) below would be that Fred ate 
some and possibly all of the cake.  Indeed, (2) would be felicitous with this 
interpretation.  However, the pragmatic interpretation would be that Fred ate some, 
but not all, of the cake.  Here, (3) would be a felicitous follow-up. 
(1) Fred ate some of the cake. 
(2) In fact, Fred ate all of the cake. 
(3) But Fred did not eat all of the cake. 
Scalar implicatures share some properties with irony: namely, the generation 
of a semantic analysis and a pragmatic inference.  As with irony, a great deal of work 
on scalar implicatures has been devoted to understanding when and how listeners 
reach these two interpretations.  That is, given sufficient context, can a listener reach 
the pragmatic interpretation without first going through the semantic analysis?  Or 
must semantic analysis be completed prior to pragmatic inferencing? 
Some work supports the latter alternative: the semantic analysis must be 
processed prior to the pragmatic one (Bott & Noveck, 2004; Huang & Snedeker, 
2009; Huang & Snedeker, 2011; Tomlinson et al., 2013).  For example, Huang and 
Snedeker (2009) presented participants with utterances like “Point to the girl that has 
some of the socks,” while tracking their eye movements.  The display contained a girl 
with a subset of an item (e.g., two of four total socks) and another girl that had all of 
an item (e.g., four of four total soccer balls).  Thus, there was a brief period of 
ambiguity, starting from some and ending before the end of the noun (-ks).  While the 
semantic meaning of some was compatible with either girl, the pragmatic meaning 
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was only compatible with the girl with the socks.  Huang and Snedeker found that 
participants were slower to look at the girl with the socks compared to trials with 
unambiguous terms like all, two, and three.  The delay for the pragmatic meaning of 
some indicates that listeners perform the semantic analysis prior to generating the 
pragmatic inference. This is compatible with the current findings from Experiment 1.  
However, other work suggests that the pragmatic meaning of some can be 
accessed immediately.  For example, Grodner, Klein, Carbary, and Tanenhaus  (2010) 
used a visual world eye-tracking paradigm to determine when listeners reach the 
pragmatic interpretation of some.  Participants heard utterances containing some (e.g., 
“Click on the girl who has summa the balloons”) and had to select the character 
(Target) on the screen corresponding to the utterance.  (Note that Grodner and 
colleagues used “summa” instead of “some” to provide an earlier phonetic signal to 
make the timing more comparable to literal controls.)  The display contained one girl 
with a subset of an item (e.g., two of four balloons) and another girl that had all of an 
item (e.g., four of four balls).  Other trials included non-scalar quantifiers like alla 
and nunna.  Grodner et al. found that participants looked to the Target as quickly for 
summa as they did for nunna and alla, indicating that accessing the pragmatic 
interpretation of some does not induce processing delays.  This suggests that listeners 
can reach the pragmatic interpretation of some without having to first access the 
semantic one. 
This dissertation adds new evidence to the literature on the semantics-
pragmatics interface.  Similar to Huang and Snedeker’s (2009) findings, looks to the 
Target were greater overall for literal utterances than ironic ones.  Thus, at least in 
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magnitude, it appears that pragmatic inferencing is delayed compared to semantic 
analysis.  Whether or not this indicates sequential or simultaneous access of the literal 
and ironic interpretations is a topic for future work (but see the below section on 
sentence processing for some conjectures).  Work by Giora and Fein (2007) can 
inform this debate to some degree, however.  As described in Chapter 1, Giora and 
Fein had participants complete a lexical decision task after reading ironic utterances 
in irony- or literal-biasing contexts.  They found that less familiar ironies were 
interpreted literally initially (150ms post-offset) and ironically later (1,000ms post-
offset).  This is consistent with the present findings, where less frequent ironic 
compliments are processed more slowly than their literal counterparts.  This is also 
consistent with some of the work on scalar implicatures, where semantic analysis 
occurs prior to pragmatic inferencing (Bott & Noveck, 2004; Huang & Snedeker, 
2009; Huang & Snedeker, 2011; Tomlinson et al., 2013).  However, Giora and Fein 
also showed that more familiar ironies were interpreted both literally and ironically 
initially.  This could explain the difference in Target look magnitude for ironic 
criticisms and their literal counterparts that was observed here.  The simultaneous 
access of the literal and ironic interpretations would generate conflict, which would 
then need to be resolved using cognitive control.  This, in turn, would aid in resolving 
the subsequent Stroop trial conflict. 
The results described here seem to correspond best to an account where the 
interpretation of scalar implicatures is delayed compared to literal controls.  In this 
dissertation, the interpretation of irony is similarly delayed.  However, because there 
are different forms of irony that vary in frequency, a more nuanced account must be 
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offered.  Such an account must explain both the overall delay in irony, as well as the 
difference in interpretation rate attributable to irony frequency (see the above section 
on traditional theories of irony processing). 
Social cognition & the lexicon 
The finding that both forms of irony are more difficult to comprehend than 
their literal counterparts is rather surprising given the abundance of psycholinguistic 
research showing early effects of context on interpretation (Altmann & Steedman, 
1988; Altmann, Garnham, & Dennis, 1992; Tanenhaus et al.,1995; Trueswell & 
Tanenhaus, 1991).  In addition, work using a fast priming paradigm suggests that 
detailed argument information is accessible very early in comprehension for verbs 
(Trueswell & Kim, 1998) and nouns (Novick, Kim, & Trueswell, 2003).  However, 
even when comprehenders are presented with a frequent form of irony (represented as 
across-speaker context), and given a perfectly reliable cue to irony (within-speaker 
context – i.e., speaker identity), there is an overall delay in processing compared to 
literal utterances.  This is unlikely to be due to the explicit nature of the speaker 
identity information, as other work has indicated that comprehenders can use 
explicitly-provided information about speakers to aid in real-time comprehension 
(Arnold et al., 2007; Arnold et al., in press; Gibbs et al., 1991; Grodner & Bergen, 
2012; Katz & Pexman, 1997; Pexman & Olineck, 2002).  In addition, telling the 
listeners different information about the speaker (e.g., ironic in Exp. 1, opposite in 
Exp. 2A) alters their eye-movement patterns.  Furthermore, as evidenced by the 
findings in Experiment 3, comprehending frequent ironic criticisms still generates 
conflict.  These findings seem to suggest that, unlike homophones, irony may not be 
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stored pre-compiled in the lexicon.  If it were, providing a perfectly reliable cue to 
interpretation (in the form of speaker identity) should lead to interpretation speeds 
equivalent to literal meanings.  For example, upon hearing “fabulous,” the listener 
immediately activates its phonological, semantic, and (perhaps) argument structure 
properties.  If irony were lexicalized, this rapid recognition process would also 
include the ironic interpretation of “fabulous” (e.g., “terrible”).  However, because 
this dissertation demonstrates that irony is delayed, it suggests that it is not stored in 
the lexicon. 
In addition, it is unlikely that the delay for irony is due to a general delay in 
integrating or consulting speaker identity information.  In fact, there is a great deal of 
work indicating that comprehenders track and use information about speaker identity 
and goals to guide interpretations (Bergen & Grodner, 2012; Brown-Schmidt et al., 
2008; Regel et al., 2010; Van Berkum et al., 2008; Yildirim et al., 2016).  For 
example, Van Berkum et al. (2008) had participants listen to utterances whose content 
did not match inferences about the identity of the speaker (e.g., “If I only looked like 
Britney Spears” in a male voice).  They found that these mismatched utterances 
generated an ERP as early as 200-300ms after the critical word onset.  Thus, listeners 
rapidly make use of speaker identity information when comprehending speech. 
It is also improbable that the delay for irony is due to prosody effects.  As 
described above, prosody was not manipulated in any of the present experiments.  
However, there is work indicating that there is no particular ironic tone of voice 
(Attardo et al., 2003; Bryant & Fox Tree, 2005; Kreuz & Roberts, 1995; Rockwell, 
2000) and that listeners do not rely on specific vocal cues to identify verbal irony 
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(Bryant & Fox Tree, 2005).  Thus, even though the ironic and literal speakers did not 
differ in prosody, it should not account for the irony delay. 
While the overall delay for irony may not be attributable to the slow access to 
speaker identity information, it could be due to the necessity of performing semantic 
analysis in addition to pragmatic inferencing.  Whether or not these processes happen 
sequentially or simultaneously, it seems that both must necessarily take place.  This 
also explains the fact that even the more conventional uses of irony generate conflict 
that must be resolved (Exp. 3).  The literal and ironic interpretations of the utterance 
compete, leading to delays and the engagement of cognitive control. 
This raises the question: if irony is not stored in the lexicon, where is 
information about irony frequency maintained?  One possibility is that this 
information is simply represented as communicative inferences.  Indeed, we know 
that listeners track and use a range of contextual information to interpret irony.  First, 
they track speaker identity and linguistic tendencies.  The fact that listeners’ eye 
movements are different for ironic (Exp. 1) and opposite (Exp. 2A) speakers lends 
credence to this.  In addition, listeners use information about speakers’ language use 
to draw conclusions about the speakers themselves.  Indeed, how listeners view a 
speaker is influenced by whether the speaker is ironic or uses opposites frequently 
(Exp. 2B).  Finally, listeners track information about irony frequency.  While this 
information may not be used immediately during irony comprehension (i.e., Exp. 1 
magnitude effect), it is used eventually (Exp. 1 rate effect).  Thus, listeners observe 
individual instances of each type of irony (criticisms and compliments), which must 
ultimately accumulate as probabilistic, speaker-independent information.  Thus, 
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listeners have knowledge indicating the ironic criticisms are more frequent than 
compliments.  When an ironic utterance is encountered, the listener brings to bear 
these various sources of information to interpret the utterance.  This is consistent with 
constraint-satisfaction accounts of language comprehension in which multiple sources 
of information—linguistic and non-linguistic—are integrated simultaneously in real-
time (Jurafsky, 1996; MacDonald, Pearlmutter, & Seidenberg, 1994; Spivey-
Knowlton, 1995).  
Of course, how these communicative inferences are stored in memory is still a 
topic of debate (Brown-Schmidt & Duff, 2016).  For example, early work by Clark 
and Marshall (1978) argued that interlocutors store diary-like memories including 
information about events and their participants.  These memory structures are special-
purpose and specific to individuals.  More recently, researchers have argued that more 
general forms of memory support representations about interlocutors and their shared 
experiences (Brown-Schmidt & Duff, 2016; Horton, 2007; Horton & Gerrig, 2016).  
This latter approach seems best suited to account for the present findings.  In 
particular, Brown-Schmidt and Duff (2016) argue that episodic memory may be a 
good candidate to store this kind of social communicative information.  This memory 
system can track and integrate information across speakers, time, and circumstances.  
Indeed, patients with hippocampal damage (and consequently impairments to 
episodic memory) have difficulty adjusting their referring expressions for different 
speakers (Duff, Gupta, Hengst, Tranel, & Cohen, 2011).  For example, rather than 
referring to a game as “the game” after being previously discussed, amnesic patients 
often continued using indefinite references with their interlocutors. 
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Thus, probabilities relating to different speaker goals and attitudes (and as a 
result, the frequency of different forms of irony) are tracked via episodic memory 
over the course of an individual’s lifetime, and can be used as an additional cue in 
irony comprehension.  The use of these probabilistic cues would be similar to other 
cases in which existing knowledge about speakers’ goals and attitudes are integrated 
in real time (Katz & Pexman, 1997; Pexman & Olineck, 2002).  For example, readers 
integrate information about a speaker’s occupation immediately, alongside other 
types of relevant information (e.g., lexical, syntactic; Pexman, Ferretti, & Katz, 
2000).  Similarly, listeners integrate stereotype information about a speaker’s gender, 
age, and socio-economic status as early 200-300ms after the onset of a critical word 
(Van Berkum et al., 2008).  Thus, comprehenders can rapidly make use of social 
information—tracked and encoded over the course of a lifetime—to aid in real-time 
processing.  I propose that listeners do the same for irony frequency information. 
Implications for language comprehension 
This dissertation may also speak to broader issues regarding language 
comprehension, word recognition, and sentence processing.  As described in Chapter 
1, much of the work on word recognition has focused on how context and frequency 
interact in real-time.  For example, Swinney (1979) provided evidence for a two-stage 
model of word recognition.  He showed that for homophones, both possible meanings 
are accessed initially, regardless of context.  Then, a post-lexical access process 
integrates context and selects the appropriate meaning.  Duffy et al. (1988) expanded 
on this work by considering the frequency of the homophone’s two meanings.  They 
showed that for non-equibiased homophones, context supporting the subordinate 
 102 
 
meaning led to competition between the two possible meanings.  This is similar to the 
findings observed here for ironic compliments: when context supported the less 
frequent ironic meaning, it led to delayed interpretation.  However, Duffy et al. 
showed that for equibiased homophones, only the relevant meaning was activated 
initially.  The findings in this dissertation seem to diverge here from the word 
recognition literature.  When context was provided in support of ironic criticisms, 
there was still a delay in interpretation (Exp. 1).  This was the case even when the 
context (i.e., speaker identity) perfectly predicted utterance interpretation.  
Furthermore, Experiment 3 revealed that even for this frequent form of irony, 
comprehenders experienced conflict during processing. 
The use of context in real-time language has also been explored extensively 
with regard to syntactic processing.  For example, Trueswell, Sekerina, Hill, and 
Logrip (1999) presented participants with sentences like (4): 
(4) Put the frog on the napkin into the box.  
Sentence (4) is temporarily ambiguous, because “on the napkin” could refer to the 
Destination of the putting event, or to a Modifier indicating which frog to move.  
These sentences were presented with one of two visual scenes.  One scene supported 
the Destination interpretation (1-Referent context) and contained a frog on a napkin 
(target), a box (correct goal), an empty napkin (incorrect goal) box, and a horse 
(competitor).  In the 1-Referent context, the modifier “on the napkin” would be 
unnecessary since there is only one frog.  Thus, participants should initially interpret 
“on the napkin” as the destination.  The other scene supported the Modifier 
interpretation (2-Referent context) and replaced the competitor object with another 
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frog that was not on a napkin.  Because the comprehender in the 2-Referent context 
would need to know which frog to move, they should immediately interpret “on the 
napkin” as a modifier, rather than a destination.  These conditions were also 
compared to conditions where the sentence was unambiguous, as in (5) below. 
(5) Put the frog that’s on the napkin into the box.  
Tanenhaus et al. (1999) found that looks to the incorrect destination (the 
empty napkin) only increased in the 1-Referent ambiguous condition.  Thus, in the 2-
Referent context, the participants were able to rapidly use contextual information (the 
presence of two frogs) to determine that “on the napkin” was a modifier, not the 
destination.  Similarly, participants made the most errors in the 1-Referent ambiguous 
condition.  These data indicate that adults can make use of contextual information 
very early in syntactic processing.  This seems to conflict with the present findings, 
where participants did not use context early.  That is, even when provided with a 
perfectly reliable cue to irony (speaker identity), there were still fewer overall looks 
to the Target in the ironic conditions.  This is in spite of the fact that comprehenders 
can make rapid use of explicitly-provided information about speaker tendencies 
during real-time processing (Arnold et al., in press; Grodner & Bergen, 2012; Katz & 
Pexman, 1997; Pexman & Olineck, 2002).  Thus, as discussed above, it seems that 
comprehending irony necessarily involves accessing both the literal and ironic 
meanings, which then generates conflict and interpretation delays. 
More recent work on syntactic parsing has focused on the cognitive 
mechanisms that enable listeners to resolve syntactic ambiguities.  In particular, this 
work suggests that comprehending temporarily ambiguous sentences such as (4) 
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above and (6) below engages cognitive control (Hsu & Novick, 2016; January et al., 
2009; Kan et al., 2013). 
(6) The basketball player accepted the contract would have to be negotiated. 
This is because during a garden path sentence, the two possible interpretations 
compete.  In example (6) above, these two interpretations would be (a) the player 
agreed to a new contract and (b) the player acknowledged the need to negotiate the 
contract.  While a listener would temporarily consider (a) to be the appropriate 
interpretation, the word “would” indicates that (b) is in fact the correct interpretation.   
The activation of and competition between the two possible interpretations is 
supported by work using the conflict adaptation paradigm.  This research indicates 
that completing a high-conflict cognitive control task prior to reading a garden path 
sentence leads to faster garden path recovery (Hsu & Novick, 2016).  Furthermore, 
reading a garden path sentence facilitates performance on a subsequent cognitive 
control task (Kan et al., 2013).  This bidirectional effect indicates that (a) processing a 
garden path sentence mitigates the Stroop effect on the next trial via sustained 
engagement of cognitive control, and (b) engaging cognitive control on a prior trial 
facilitates the subsequent revision of a temporarily ambiguous sentence. 
This work raises an interesting possible explanation for the lack of adaptation 
observed in Experiment 4. It is possible that observing conflict adaptation in only one 
direction, as is the case here, could indicate that the literal interpretation is accessed 
prior to the ironic one.  As described in Chapter 5, the listener might first activate the 
literal interpretation and then the ironic one.  As a result, conflict would arise later 
during the ironic utterance, after both interpretations were already accessed.  Thus, 
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the resulting engagement of cognitive control would carry over to the subsequent 
Stroop trial, but that adaptation would not occur in the opposite direction.  This would 
result in adaptation from sentence to Stroop (Experiment 3), but not from Stroop to 
sentence (Experiment 4).  It is important to note that the experiments in the present 
dissertation were not designed to test this specifically.  Furthermore, there is still a lot 
that is unknown about the refractory period for cognitive control engagement, and it 
is hard to interpret null results.  Nonetheless, it is an interesting possibility that could 
generate a new interpretation of the results in Experiments 3 and 4 of this dissertation.  
As discussed in Chapter 5, the lack of adaptation observed in Experiment 4 
may also be influenced by the setup of the experiment itself.  There are a number of 
possible experimental causes for this null result, such as the use of only two possible 
referents in the visual scene and the increased memory demands compared to Hsu and 
Novick’s (2016) study.  In addition, Experiments 3 and 4 only include positive 
ironies, which are the most frequent types.  It is possible that if these experiments 
included negative ironies, the conflict between the literal and ironic interpretations 
would be mitigated by prior cognitive control engagement.  Because ironic 
compliments are more delayed than ironic criticisms (compared to their literal 
counterparts), ironic compliments might generate more conflict.  Thus, effects of 
cognitive control engagement on interpretation might be more clearly detectable.  Of 
course, this is an empirical question that should be tested in future research. 
Limitations and future work 
The experiments in this dissertation have a few limitations that are important 
to consider when interpreting the findings and planning future work.  First, it is 
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possible that the observed delay for irony may be due to insufficiently strong context.  
Perhaps more implicit cues, such as prosody, would speed up ironic interpretations 
above and beyond the present, more explicit cue (speaker identity).  In addition, it 
might be useful to give participants more time during the critical utterances to 
identify the speaker and their linguistic tendencies before the adjective is produced.  
Indeed, some work suggests that early in an utterance, speaker goal information might 
be inaccessible or too resource-intensive to use (Lin, Keysar, & Epley, 2010). 
There are also several aspects of the conflict adaptation experiments that 
should be further investigated.  First, it is possible that the conflict adaptation results 
in Experiment 3 could be driven by task difficulty.  Specifically, it could be the case 
that comprehending irony is a difficult task (compared to comprehending literal 
utterances), which consequently leads to increased attention.  This increased attention 
could then facilitate performance on a subsequent difficult task.  Given that conflict 
adaptation was not observed from the Stroop task to the sentence task, this seems 
unlikely.  However, a potential follow-up experiment could replace the Stroop task 
with a difficult, but non-conflict task and observe performance on that task as a 
function of the prior sentence trial type.  If the present effects are the result of 
competition per se, then performance on the difficult, non-conflict task should not be 
modulated by the prior sentence type (literal or ironic).  
There are also several modifications that could be made to Experiment 4 to 
test for conflict adaptation from the Stroop task to the sentence task.  First, as 
described in Chapter 5, participants could be given additional practice trials.  This 
would rule out the possibility that the lack of adaptation effects was driven by high 
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memory demands.  If participants were having difficulty remembering the speaker 
identities, it could mask any adaptation effects.  This possibility is slightly weakened 
by the fact that Experiment 3 did show adaptation, but the effect on sentence 
comprehension may simply be harder to detect (or, as described above, the timing of 
the conflict may play a role).  In addition, it would be useful to run Experiments 3 and 
4 with negative adjectives.  This would reveal the extent to which conflict is 
experienced for the less frequent form of irony.  
Conclusion and closing remarks 
To conclude, the goal of this dissertation was to better understand how context 
and frequency interact during the real-time comprehension of ironic utterances.  
Across four experiments, several key findings have emerged.  First, the overall 
interpretation of irony is delayed relative to literal utterances.  In Experiment 1, the 
overall magnitude of Target looks was greater for literal utterances than ironic ones.  
This was the case regardless of irony frequency.  Second, the speed of irony 
interpretation is modulated by frequency.  The rate of increase in Target looks was 
greater for frequent ironic criticisms than infrequent ironic compliments.  Third, the 
conclusions that listeners draw about ironic speakers differ from those made about 
“opposite” speakers.  Opposite speakers were judged as being weirder and more 
confusing compared to ironic ones, and comprehenders processed opposite utterances 
differently from ironic ones.  Finally, comprehending ironic utterances generates 
conflict, even for the more frequent form of irony.  Compared to interpreting a literal 
utterance, interpreting an ironic utterance led to improved performance on a 
subsequent high-conflict Stroop trial. 
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Taken together, these results suggest a model in which the literal 
interpretation of an ironic utterance is activated before (or simultaneously with) the 
ironic interpretation.  Upon hearing the utterance, the listener consults the context and 
determines that the literal interpretation is inappropriate.  Thus, the listener generates 
a pragmatic inference to reach the ironic interpretation.  This will be faster if the 
utterance is positive (ironic criticism) compared to if it is negative (ironic 
compliment), because frequency determines the strength of the cue.  Finally, the 
listener engages cognitive control to inhibit or revise the literal interpretation and 






Instructions for Participants in Experiment 1 
 
In this experiment, you’re going to see two characters and listen while a narrator 
describes a scene involving the characters. Then you will hear a male or female 
speaker comment on one of the character’s actions.  
 
Lists 1-4 (literal female, ironic male) 
 
The female speaker, Literal Lucy, always means what she says. Every time she says 
something, she always means it literally. 
 
For example, if it is raining outside, she might say, “Wow, what a terrible day!”  
 
The male speaker, Ironic Ike, has a quirky sense of humor. Every time he says 
something, he always means it ironically. 
 
For example, if it is raining outside, he might say, “Wow, what a beautiful day!” 
 
Lists 5-8 (literal male, ironic female) 
 
The male speaker, Literal Luke, always means what he says. Every time he says 
something, he always means it literally. 
 
For example, if it is raining outside, he might say, “Wow, what a terrible day!” 
 
The female speaker, Ironic Irene, has a quirky sense of humor. Every time she says 
something, she always means it ironically. 
 
 For example, if it is raining outside, she might say, “Wow, what a beautiful day!” 
 
All Lists 
Your task is to use the mouse to select the character that the speaker describes. 







Critical Items Used in Experiments 1 and 2A 
 
 
Item Vignette Critical Utterance 
1 Fred and Sally did their holiday shopping.  Fred/Sally 
when shopping early and got all of the gifts he/she 
needed.  Fred/Sally went shopping at the last minute 
and only got half of the gifts he/she needed. 
What a fantastic/ 
horrible planner he is. 
2 Fred and Sally went golfing.  Fred/Sally got a hole in 
one.  Fred/Sally hit the ball into a neighbor’s window.   
What a remarkable/ 
hopeless golfer she is. 
3 Fred and Sally competed in a swim meet.  Fred/Sally 
finished in first place.  Fred/Sally finished in last 
place. 
What an incredible/ 
abominable swimmer 
he is. 
4 Fred and Sally went out to play darts with their 
friends.  Fred/Sally got a bullseye on his/her first try.  
Fred/Sally missed the dartboard completely. 
What an impressive/ 
atrocious thrower she 
is. 
5 Fred and Sally drove home at night while no one else 
was on the road.  Fred/Sally obeyed the speed limit 
the entire way home.  Fred/Sally sped the entire way 
home. 
What an excellent / 
abominable driver she 
is. 
6 Fred and Sally gave a speech at a local school.  At 
Fred’s/Sally’s speech, the audience hung on his/her 
every word.  At Fred’s/Sally’s speech, the audience 
fell asleep. 
What a magnificent/ 
incompetent speaker 
he is. 
7 Fred and Sally babysat for their neighbor’s baby.  
When Fred/Sally was babysitting and the baby cried, 
he/she soothed him until he fell asleep.  When 
Fred/Sally was babysitting and the baby cried, he/she 
yelled and made the baby cry more. 
What a wonderful/ 
horrendous babysitter 
she is. 
8 Fred and Sally volunteered to take care of their 
neighbor’s dog while he was away.  Fred/Sally walked 
and fed the dog three times a day.  Fred/Sally forgot to 
walk or feed the dog for several days. 
What an upstanding/ 
coldhearted neighbor 
he is. 
9 Fred and Sally decided to start a vegetable garden.  
Fred/Sally watered the plants every day and he/she 
grew many vegetables.  Fred/Sally forgot to water the 
plants and they all died. 
What an excellent/ 
terrible gardener he 
is. 
10 Fred and Sally had to write a report for work.  What an exemplary/ 
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Fred/Sally stayed in his/her office until he/she was 
finished.  Fred/Sally spent the day playing computer 
games instead. 
awful worker she is. 
11 Fred and Sally took pictures at their friend’s baseball 
game.  Fred/Sally got a picture of his/her friend hitting 




photographer he is. 
12 Fred and Sally decided to buy their children a pet.  
Fred/Sally bought his/her child a fish.  Fred/Sally 
bought his/her child a wolf. 
What a responsible/ 
horrendous parent she 
is. 
13 Fred and Sally took care of their friend’s house while 
he was away.  Fred/Sally mowed the lawn and took in 
the mail every day.  Fred/Sally forgot to mow the 
lawn and take in the mail the entire time. 
What a responsible/ 
terrible friend she is. 
14 Fred and Sally went on a weekend trip.  Fred/Sally fir 
everything he/she needed in one suitcase.  Fred/Sally 
filled up three entire suitcases. 
What a terrific/awful 
traveler he is. 
15 Fred and Sally’s roofs were damaged in a storm and 
they decided to repair them.  Fred/Sally repaired the 
roof so that it was as good as new.  Fred/Sally tried to 
repair the roof but fell and broke his/her arm. 
What a remarkable/ 
bumbling homeowner 
she is. 
16 Fred and Sally worked at a newspaper and had to 
write many articles.  Fred/Sally concentrated hard and 
wrote all of the articles before the deadline.  
Fred/Sally didn’t write any articles by the deadline. 
What a phenomenal/ 
worthless journalist 
he is. 
17 Fred and Sally participated in a food drive.  Fred/Sally 
donated an entire box full of food.  Fred/Sally didn’t 
even fill a single box with food. 
What an outstanding/ 
self-centered citizen 
he is. 
18 Fred and Sally constructed a tree house.  
Fred’s/Sally’s tree house lasted for several years.  
Fred’s/Sally’s tree house collapsed after one day. 
What a fantastic/ 
incompetent builder 
she is. 
19 Fred and Sally decided to do some baking.  Fred/Sally 
baked three beautiful cakes.  Fred/Sally only made 
one cake and he/she burned it. 
What an amazing/ 
dreadful chef he is. 
20 Fred and Sally played a game of soccer with their 
friends.  Fred/Sally scored five goals.  Fred/Sally 
kicked the soccer ball and his/her shoe fell off. 
What a gifted/ 





Instructions for Participants in Experiment 2B 
 
Speaker Group A (literal and ironic)  
 
Note: half of the participants in Group A saw Lucy and Ike, the other half saw Luke 
and Irene 
 
This study consists of three parts. In Part 1, you are going to watch 8 brief videos 
involving different characters. Each character will perform an action. After the 
characters perform these actions, one of two speakers will describe one of the 
characters. One speaker, Literal Lucy/Literal Luke, always says what he/she means. 
The other character, Ironic Ike/Ironic Irene, is always ironic. Note that Literal 
Luke/Ironic Ike is male and Literal Lucy/Ironic Irene is female. 
  
In Part 2 of the study, you're going to be asked several questions about the two 
speakers, Literal Lucy/Literal Luke and Ironic Ike/Ironic Irene. Please answer these 
questions based on the videos you watched in Part 1. Finally, in Part 3, you'll be 
asked a few optional demographic questions. 
 
Speaker Group B (literal and opposite)  
 
Note: half of the participants in Group B saw Lucy and Ollie, the other half saw Luke 
and Olive 
 
This study consists of three parts. In Part 1, you are going to watch 8 brief videos 
involving different characters. Each character will perform an action. After the 
characters perform these actions, one of two speakers will describe one of the 
characters. One speaker, Literal Lucy/Literal Luke, always says what he/she means. 
The other character, Opposite Ollie/Opposite Olive, is always ironic. Note that Literal 
Luke/Opposite Ollie is male and Literal Lucy/Opposite Olive is female. 
  
In Part 2 of the study, you're going to be asked several questions about the two 
speakers, Literal Lucy/Literal Luke and Opposite Ollie/Opposite Olive. Please answer 
these questions based on the videos you watched in Part 1. Finally, in Part 3, you'll be 







Critical Items Used in Experiments 3 and 4 
 
Item Critical Utterance 
1 What a splendid planner she is. 
2 What a remarkable golfer he is. 
3 What an incredible swimmer he is. 
4 What an accomplished thrower he is. 
5 What an excellent driver he is. 
6 What a magnificent speaker she is. 
7 What a compassionate babysitter she is. 
8 What an upstanding neighbor she is. 
9 What an admirable gardener she is. 
10 What an exemplary worker she is. 
11 What an extraordinary photographer she is. 
12 What a responsible parent he is.  
13 What a reliable friend she is. 
14 What a terrific librarian he is. 
15 What a savvy homeowner she is. 
16 What a dedicated journalist he is. 
17 What an outstanding citizen he is. 
18 What a fantastic builder she is. 
19 What an amazing chef he is. 
20 What a gifted athlete she is. 
21 What a wonderful artist she is. 
22 What an effective salesperson he is.  
23 What an exceptional performer he is.  
24 What a commendable Bee Keeper she is.  
25 What a lucky gambler he is.  
26 What a graceful ice skater he is.  
27 What an athletic hiker he is. 
28 What a skilled dancer she is. 
29 What a supportive teammate he is.  
30 What a spectacular cook she is. 
31 What a strong gym-goer he is. 
32 What a knowledgeable teacher she is.  
33 What an impressive bowler he is.  
34 What a fast runner she is. 
35 What a marvelous singer she is. 
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36 What a hardworking employee he is.  
37 What an attentive spy she is. 
38 What a talented surfer he is. 
39 What an observant manicurist he is. 
40 What a terrific folder he is. 
41 What a successful farmer she is. 
42 What a phenomenal fisher she is. 
43 What a handy mechanic she is. 
44 What a prepared host he is. 
45 What a superb student he is. 
46 What a qualified captain she is. 
47 What a skilled magician he is. 
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